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ABSTRACT
The Taiwanese automobile industry was established in 1953 under
the protection of the government. After forty years of development,
however, Taiwan's manufacturers have not kept up with the local
demand, and as a result about 30 percent of the automobile market is
now made up of imported cars. In stark contrast, Korea, with a similar
economic background and structure in the 1970s, has become a new
force in shaping the dynamics of the global automobile industry.
An economic analysis carried out in this thesis shows that an
inefficient market structure has impeded the growth of Taiwan's
automobile industry. Taiwan has one of the largest car markets in Asia,
but the industry there cannot take full advantage of it because eleven
small-scale firms share this domestic market without significant exports.
Therefore, production costs remain too high resulting from a lack of
economies of scale.
The present tendency toward Taiwan's market structure is a
consolidation of current manufacturers, a plausible solution for the
problems of inefficiency. However, this trend is not strong even though
these individual producers barely make a profit. Moreover, the free-trade
stance that the Taiwanese government has adopted will add to the
increasingly competitive environment. Recognizing their own problems,
these auto makers are shifting their focus to the emerging Chinese
market, the market with the most potential for the next century.
In this thesis, the necessity for consolidation in the Taiwanese
automobile industry and the factors impeding this consolidation process
are examined. Other alternatives to improve economic efficiency will also
be offered as a reference for policy-makers either in the government or in
the private sector.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Alice H. Amsden
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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I. Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Taiwanese automobile industry was started forty years ago
with the establishment of Yue Loong Motor Corporation Ltd. in 1953.
After decades of development, however, this industry still remains
entangled in an inefficient infrastructure.
Although the quality of Taiwan-made cars is sufficient for
international competition, the high cost of production limits their
competitiveness. According to past experience, an automobile
manufacturer should have a production volume of at least 100,000
units in order to enjoy the cost advantages that come with mass
production. However, eleven manufacturers make up the Taiwanese
market which is large enough for only two or three firms. They share the
domestic market evenly and have negligible exports and, therefore, none
of them has a large-scale production. This division of the market results
in the high costs of Taiwanese cars, which are 1.3 to 1.4 times those of
Japanese cars. With too many manufacturers and a limited and nearly
saturated domestic market, the Taiwanese automobile industry is unable
to achieve economies of scale that can bring costs down enough for it to
be competitive in the world market. This, as Justin Su has said, creates a
vicious cycle (high costs =>no exports =>no economies of scale) that the
industry cannot seem to break out of.1
The Taiwanese automobile industry is particularly interesting for
several reasons. First, Taiwan's automobile industrial policy has been far
less successful than similar policies that were devised and implemented
for such strategic industries as steel, electronics, and petrochemicals.2 If
1Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p2.
2 Amold, Walter. 1989. "Bureaucratic Politics, State Capacity, and Taiwan's Automobile Industrial
Policy," in Modern China. Vol. 15 No. 2, April 1989. p180.
we are correct in saying that the Taiwanese government did not have
enough experience and knowledge to develop its own automobile
industry, how could it have succeeded in penetrating into the world
markets in other industries? There must be some hidden difficulties
behind the facts from which we can learn some lessons.
Second, this slow growth of the Taiwanese automobile industry can
also be contrasted with the successful development of the Korean
automobile industry, which began with the establishment of the Sanara
Motor Co. in 1962, nine years after Taiwan had started its automobile
industry. Korea, now being called "the second Japan," became the fifth
largest country in world automobile production by 1994. Korea is the
first of the developing countries that have actually succeeded in
producing vehicles of world standards. The country's top three car
manufacturers, the Hyundai Group, the Daewoo Group and Kia Motors,
not only design and manufacture their own models, but also export over
400,000 vehicles a year. They are relying less on the US market and
export increasing numbers of automobiles to countries in Europe, the
Middle East and Latin America.3 Korean automobiles have retained their
competitive prices, despite the problems besetting the country's
automobile industry. Even Taiwanese car-makers have been threatened
by low-priced Korean imports. Why are the automobile industries in
these two countries, which had an almost identical structure and had
achieved comparative levels of local content by the early 1970s, so
different after decades of developing? What accounts for the striking
divergence?
Third, a similarly inefficient market structure as that in Taiwan
can also be found in many developing countries, such as Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Thailand. An understanding of the Taiwanese automobile
industry is crucial for these countries, as a negative example, when they
3 Paisley, Ed. "An Industry In Suspension," in Far Eastern Economic Review. August 13, 1992. p3 9 .
develop their automobile industries, and this present study may be
helpful to them.
Throughout this thesis, the author will try to discover reasonable
answers to these interesting questions and, furthermore, make
recommendations to the Taiwanese automobile industry.
1.2 Research Goal, Scope, and Methodology
The goal of this research is to identify the problems in the current
Taiwanese automobile industry and endeavor to form a policy proposal
as a useful reference for both managers and government officials in the
automobile industry.
The present research of Taiwan's automobile industry attempts to
elucidate the implications between governmental policy and the
development of this industry. Because the topic is too broad and
complicated, the scope of this research will narrow down and focus on
possible ways to reduce the economic loss due to the inefficient
infrastructure. The key concern here will be the consolidation of the
eleven existing manufacturers currently operating in Taiwan.
The research methodology in this thesis is quite straightforward.
The procedure will be based on three steps. First, the existence of
problems will be proved and their significance will be identified. Second,
the issue will be further analyzed and the factors resulting in these
problems will be explained. Finally, possible solutions to the problems
will be provided as a conclusion.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
There are a total of 5 chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 gives an
overview of the research. Chapter 2 introduces the automobile market,
manufacturers, and government industry policies in the Taiwanese
automobile industry. Chapter 3 identifies the major problem in this
industry, that is, the high costs of production due to a lack of economies
of scale. Chapter 4 determines the reasons causing the economic
inefficiency and why consolidation did not happen in the Taiwanese
automobile industry. Chapter 5 makes recommendations to its future
perspectives.
II. Introduction to Taiwan's Automobile Industry
2.1 Current Market Situation
In 1993, the total annual production of automobiles in Taiwan was
404,500 units, which accounted for 74.8% of the domestic market.
Taiwan was ranked as the fourteenth largest country in the world
automobile production, as shown in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1: 1992 World Automobile Production
Rank Country Name Annual Production Percentage in the
(units) world automobile
production
1 Japan 12,490,000 25.3%
2 United States 9,770,000 20.0%
3 Germany 8,190,000 16.60%
4 France 3,780,000 7.60%
5 Spain 2,300,000 4.60%
6 Canada 1,980,000 4.00%
7 Korea 1,720,000 3.50%
8 Italy 1,680,000 3.40%
9 United Kingdom 1,540,000 3.10%
10 Commonwealth of 1,440,000 2.90%
Independent States
11 Brazil 1,090,000 2.20%
12 Mexico 1,080,000 2.20%
13 China 920,000 1.90%
14 Taiwan 430,000 0.89%
15 India 36,000 0.73%
Others 55,000 1.10%
Total 49,430,000 100.00%
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
General information on Taiwan's automobile industry is provided
in Exhibit 2. In 1993, the number of domestic companies related to the
automobile industry was 4,420, accounting for 5.5% of the
manufacturing industry in Taiwan, and the number of workers directly
involved in this industry was 120,000, accounting for 5.5% of those in
manufacturing industries.
Exhibit 2: Current Situation in the Taiwanese Automobile Industry
Item Units 1993
Output Value of Taiwan Billion U.S.D. 14.2
Automobile Industry
Number of Workers Thousands of 120
People
Annual Output Value Per Thousand U.S.D. 120
Person Per Person Per
Year
Percentage of R&D to Sales Percent 2.2
Percentage of Technical Percent 10
Engineers to Total Workers
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
There are currently eleven automobile assembly plants, as listed in
Exhibit 3 and their sales almost entirely depend on the domestic market.
Except for those manufacturers located in countries with large domestic
demand, like the US, most of the automobile manufacturers are eager to
apply an export strategy to lower their costs by increasing their
production, as do Japanese and Korean firms. However, the number of
exported assembled automobiles from Taiwan is very small. After
reaching a peak of 6,859 units in 1988, exports declined to 649 units in
1993 (China market was not included), which accounts for only 0.2% of
the total production. Consequently, almost none of the firms owns a
large enough plant to achieve economies of scale. In 1993, the number of
manufacturers with annual production above 100,000 units was only
one and above 50,000 units was three.
Exhibit 3: Automobile Manufacturers in Taiwan
Manufacture Date 1993 Capacity Capacity Market Sales
rs Est. Producti Utilizatio Share Rank
on n
Ford Lio Ho 1973.1 111,834 110,000 101.7% 28.2% 1
Chung Hwa 1974.1 85,045 93,000 91.4% 20.0% 2
0
Yue Loong 1953.9 55.853 120,000 46.5% 14.6% 3
Kuozoi 1984.4 57.504 70,000 82.1% 13.3% 4
San Yang 1967.5 40,098 100,000 40.1% 9.8% 5
Yeu Tyen 1977.5 23,920 40,000 59.8% 6.0% 6
Prince 1965.5 9,665 24,000 40.2% 2.4% 7
Ta Ching 1987.1 8,475 30,000 28.3% 2.3% 8
0
San Fu 1966.3 5,471 36,000 15.2% 1.8% 9
CAC 1988.3 6,669 24,000 27.8% 1.6% 10
Chin Chun 1994.6 -------- 10,000
Source: Industrial Bureau of the
of China
Furthermore, these Taiwan
much on Japanese firms, which
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
automobile manufacturers depend too
are the main cooperation partners for
providing technical support. Of all the current eleven manufacturers,
except for the cooperation between San Fu and Renault, France, CAC
and Citroen, France, and Chin Chun with Volkswagen, Germany, the
rest of these firms are in some degree of cooperation or joint venture with
Japanese firms. As for the foreign technical cooperation partners for
parts and component suppliers, 95 percent of these firms are also
Japanese firms. This dependence has weakened the Taiwanese
manufacturers' incentives to spend more on Research and Development
(R&D) with a hope to build their own technology. It also has significant
effects on the costs of Taiwan-made cars whose major parts and
components are imported from Japan. The recent appreciation of the
Yen has caused continuously rising costs of domestic cars.4 The
exchange rate of the Yen to the American dollar had appreciated from
143.45 in 1989 to 108.75 in 1993, and the rate of appreciation in the
Yen reached as high as 24.2%. According to the current tariff, as the
Yen appreciates 1%, the costs for domestic firms to get the parts from
Japan would rise 0.58%. As for assembled cars, the total costs would
rise 0.406%. The increase ratio in costs was very close to the return
ratio. Using the average return ratio of 7% in 1989 as a example, it
would be offset by 5.7% in 1994 due to the effects of the strong Yen. This
huge increase in costs has forced the domestic producers to rationalize
their production, raise the local content of their automobiles, and
educate parts suppliers in order to reduce their costs.
The quality of domestically assembled automobiles and parts has
gradually caught up to the world standard. Facing the challenges from
growing automobile industries in other developing countries, the
Taiwanese firms are more willing to invest more on R&D and automation
because the advantage in costs no longer exists. They have to build their
competence in advanced technology in order to differentiate the markets.
In fact, We can see that this improvement already works. The quality of
4 Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China. 1994. 'Transportation
Industry," in 1993 Yearbook of the Industrial Development in Republic of China. In Chinese.
automobiles assembled by the major Taiwanese auto makers has become
the best among their affiliate manufacturers.5 In addition, the quality of
parts and components they produce has been verified by many large
foreign firms. However, as presented in Exhibit 4, the high price of
Taiwanese cars has limited their competitiveness.
Exhibit 4: Evaluation of Automobile Industries in Selected Countries
Assembly Price 2  Parts Quality
Quality1
USA
Japan **** 1.0 ****
Europe
Taiwan ** 1.3-1.4 ***
Korea ** 0.9 ***
Malaysia ** 1.5 *
Thailand ** 1.5 *
Australia ** 0.9-1.0 ****
South Africa * 1.04 **
Mexico ** 0.9 ***
Brazil ** 0.9 ***
1: * poor
•** fair
*** good
**** excellent
2: Use the average price in USA, Japan, Europe as 1.
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
The trend for future development of this industry is difficult to
predict for the following reasons. First, the results from the fierce
5 World Journal. Dec. 2, 1994. p. A18. In Chinese.
competition among domestic producers and between domestic and
imported cars still remain unclear. Second, the interaction between the
Taiwanese government's policy and auto makers is still uncertain.
However, these implications are critical to the future changes in the
market structure. Finally, the opening of the large Chinese market is a
good opportunity for the Taiwanese manufacturers to explore in the
future. However, due to high country risks in China and the delicate
political and economic relationship across the Taiwan Strait, these
Taiwanese firms are still hesitating.
2.2 Competitive Advantages And disadvantages
According to "the diamond of national advantage" (see Exhibit 5)
suggested by Porter 6 , we can analyze Taiwan's automobile industry in
four aspects to illustrate its pros and cons.
1. Factor Conditions. In the capital-intensive automobile industry,
government policy is a dominant factor for its success. The Taiwanese
government has tried hard to balance conflicting interests from
producers and consumers; producers ask government for higher
protecting tariffs while consumers ask for lower-priced automobiles.
Therefore, government policies are always fickle and unreliable to
producers. The Taiwanese government has been criticized for lacking a
long-term, consistent policy, fluctuating import policies, and unrealistic
local content ratios. In addition, Taiwan is facing labor problems
including rising labor costs, increasing labor activism, and shortage of
labor. Taiwan used to be considered a low-cost labor country, but not
any more. The increase in labor costs has taken away this advantage.
Taiwan's wage level is now 3 to 7 times higher than that of southeast
Asian countries and 10 to 15 times higher than in mainland China.
6 Porter, E. Michael. 'The Competitive advantage of nations," in Harvard Business Review 90(2) (March-
April 1990), pp. 73-93.
However, abundant human resources in Taiwan, such as skilled labor
and educated engineers, are very beneficial to this industry.
Exhibit 5: Determinants of National Advantages
Source: Porter, Michael E. 1990. "The Competitive Advantage of
Nations," in Harvard Business Review.
2. Demand Conditions. It might seem that the globalization of
competition would diminish the importance of home demand. In practice,
however, this is simply not the case, especially for the Taiwanese
automobile industry which has few exports. In fact, the composition and
characteristics of the home market usually have a disproportionate
 effect
Z/
on how companies perceive, interpret, and respond to buyer needs. In
the Taiwanese automobile market, we can see cars manufactured from
almost all over the world, and the competition among them is ferocious.
Taiwan's automobile industry gains competitive advantage because
demanding domestic buyers in Taiwan can pressure companies to
improve faster. However, corresponding to the buyers' needs for variety,
the manufacturers in Taiwan adopt a strategy of economies of scope, that
is, they produce up to 50 models with small production volume for each
one. This is a disadvantage in the current stage because the domestic
market is limited, and hence it is very difficult for these producers to
reduce their costs through economies of scale.
3. Related and Supporting Industries. The current automobile
parts industry in Taiwan is still immature. In 1990, only 300 of the total
of 2,000 parts suppliers had the quality standards and the facilities to
supply the domestic assemblers or OEM manufacturers. Most of the
parts and components exported were after-market products. However,
the closer cooperation between parts suppliers and assemblers
introduced by Japanese firms has helped this industry tremendously
both in improving quality and increasing productivity.
4. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry. Excess small-scale firms
in this industry result in an inefficient structure in Taiwan. None of them
is capable of achieving economies of scale. Facing changeable
government policy, pressure from imports, and competition among
themselves, these producers were not well prepared to meet the
international competition. Their goals were to pursue foreseeable profits
in domestic markets by taking advantage of tariff protection. In addition,
these auto makers were dependent on foreign auto manufacturers,
lacking their own design and R&D skills. However, because of increasing
pressure from imports, these firms are driven to invest more in long-term
plans in recent years.
2.3 Industrial Policies
2.3.1 Why The Automobile Industry Is Important To Taiwan
The automobile industry often plays a dominant role in a country's
economic development. In the US, the automotive industry accounts for
5 percent of GNP and 17 percent of industrial employment. It is a vital
element in the country's development because of the substantial linkages
to other economic activities. For example, it absorbs 76 percent of
aluminum alloys produced in the country, 43 percent of zinc alloys, 36
percent of cast iron, and 18 percent of uncoated flat-rolled iron and steel
products. Forward linkages to marketing, repair and maintenance, fuel
and lubricants, insurance, shipping, and accessories are equally
extensive. 7
In Taiwan, the automobile industry is especially important to its
government and other industries. Industries related to the automobile
industry account for as high as 70% of the total manufacturing
industries, as shown in Exhibit 6, and their total outputs related to this
industry are as high as 260 billion New Taiwan Dollars. Because the
automobile industry is the last link in the economic system, the
influence of its decline would track back to upstream industries until it
reaches steel and petroleum industries. Furthermore, five auto
manufacturers are within the top ten largest private enterprises. Any
managerial crisis involving these firms would soon become a public
concern and would furthermore influence public confidence in Taiwan's
economy. In addition, the technology level in the whole nation will be
promoted by developing the automobile industry. Consequently, the
Taiwanese government never gives up its ambitions to develop this
industry.
7 Yannis, Karmokolias. 1990. Automotive Industry Trends and Prospects for Investment in Developing
Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank and International Finance Corporation.
Exhibit 6: Automobile-Related Industries in Taiwan
Source: Industrial Bureau
of China
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
2.3.2 The Evolution of Automobile Industry Policies in Taiwan
Taiwan's economic bureaucracy has long distinguished itself by its
political conformity and loyalty, and this in turn has allowed the Ministry
of Economic Affairs (MOEA), and the Council for Economic Planning and
Development (CEPD) and its antecedent organizations to play a leading
role in the shaping of Taiwan's industrial policies since the early 1950s.8
The CEPD, acting in the same role as MITI in Japan and the Economic
Planning Board in South Korea, has been primarily concerned with the
strategic macro and sectoral planning for Taiwan's automobile industry.
On the other hand, MOEA's Industrial Development Bureau has been
responsible for the details and technical aspects of Taiwan's auto
8 Arnold, Walter. 1989. "Bureaucratic Politics, State Capacity, and Taiwan's Automobile Industrial
Policy," in Modern China. Vol. 15 No. 2, April 1989 p 178-214.
Industries 1986 1990 1993
Transportation Industry 6.00% 7.10% 7.47%
Chemical Material Industry 6.92% 6.98% 8.18%
Chemical Product Industry 2.08% 2.45% 2.69%
Petroleum Industry 4.56% 4.80% 5.08%
Rubber Product Industry 1.48% 1.58% 1.35%
Plastic Product Industry 8.67% 7.78% 6.21%
Metal Industry 6.73% 7.64% 9.00%
Metal Product Industry 5.15% 5.52% 5.46%
Mechanical Industry 3.86% 4.75% 4.99%
Electrical & Electronics 14.08% 17.29% 19.19%
Industry
Total 59.53% 65.89% 69.62%
industry policy formulation and implementation. According to the
characteristics of those policies in the past, the history of Taiwan's
automobile development can be classified into five periods, a framework
developed by the Industrial Bureau of the MOEA. 9
1. Passive Protection Period (1953-1960): This period began with
the incorporation of the Yue Loong Motor company in 1953. At that time,
the Taiwanese government adopted an import substitution policy, and
implemented the first four-year economic development plan. In that plan,
the government used a protection tariff (60% for sedans, 40% for buses,
trucks, and body panels, and 15% for parts and components), foreign
exchange regulation, and import permits to protect its domestic market
in order to develop low-skill, low-capital and labor-intensive industries.
Although originally linked to the national defense effort, Taiwan's
automotive industry was slow in developing because of the lack of
technological capacities, scarcity and high cost of capital, and
insufficient economies of scale in production. There was no active
program to promote the automobile industry in this period.
Throughout the 1950s, major American and European automakers
pushed their exports of fully assembled automobiles to Taiwan and had
no intention of shifting either to the production or assembly of
knockdown components in Taiwan, nor did the world's automakers show
any inclination to transfer automotive technology to Taiwan's fledgling
auto industry. Against this background, Yue Loong Motor Company,
aided by American foreign aid funds, first assumed production of auto
engines in September 1956, marking the beginning of Taiwan's highly
diversified auto industrial sector.
9 Wang, Kung. 1989. "Development Strategies for the Automobile and Parts Industry of the Republic of
China," A study in IMVP International Policy Forum. P 1-10.
Exhibit 7: The Evolution of the Taiwan Automobile Industry
Periods Passive Active Inconsistent Strategic Institutional
Protection Protection Promotion Promotion
Year 1953-1960 1961-1968 1969-1976 1977-1984 1985-1990
Industrial KD KD CKD Localize
Skill Level Assembly Assembly Assembly Parts
Manufactur
e
Major Yue Loong Yue Loong Yue Loong Yue Loong Yue Loong
Producers Ford Lio Ho Ford Lio Ho Ford Lio Ho
San Fu San Fu San Fu
San Yang San Yang San Yang
Chung Hwa Chung Hwa Chung Hwa
Yue Tyen Yue Tyen Yue Tyen
Kuozoi Kuozoi
Domestic 20% 60% 70% 70% First 3
Content Manufactur Manufactur Years 50%
e 2 out of 6 e 4 out of 15 Afterwards
Major Parts Major Parts
Foreign Willys Nissan Nissan Nissan Nissan
Relationship Nissan Toyota Fuji Fuji
Fuji GM, Ford Ford
GM Mitsubishi Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi Honda Honda
Ford Peugeot Peugeot
Honda Renault Renault
Peugeot Suzuki Suzuki
Daihatsu Daihatsu
Hino Hino
Toyota
Citroen
Opel
Import All Imported Small Small Only Only
Restrictions Automobile Passenger Passenger Japanese Japanese
Banned Cars Cars Small Small
Banned Allowed to Passenger Passenger
Small, Large be Imported Cars Cars
Trucks and then Banned Banned
Buses Restricted Japanese
Allowed to Trucks and Trucks &
be Imported Buses Buses
Allowed to Closed at
be Imported First then
SOpen again
Source: Current Status and Future Prospective of the Taiwan Automobile
Industry, Vol.19. Chang Hwa Commercial Bank. 5/91. In Chinese.
However, Yue Loong's activities were severely constrained by a lack
of automotive and production technology. From the very beginning of its
operation, Yue Loong had actively sought the transfer of technology from
abroad, proposing technological cooperation with many of the major
automakers in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. For some
time, none of the foreign automakers showed any interest in entering
into any form of technological cooperation with Yue Loong. None
perceived Taiwan as possessing adequate technological base or potential
market for an automobile industry. Eventually, Yue Loong's persistence
led to technology cooperation agreements with America's Willys
Corporation, covering Jeeps in 1956, and Japan's Nissan, covering
trucks and passenger cars in 1957. Furthermore, the "Bluebird," the first
Taiwan-assembled passenger car, was introduced to the market in March
1960 with a local content ratio of 20%.
2. Active Protection Period (1961-1968): In May 1961, the
Executive Yuan (Cabinet) approved the "Developing Domestic Automobile
Industry Program" (DDAIP). According to DDAIP, domestic automobiles
should be fuel efficient, durable, comfortable, and inexpensive.
Assemblers and parts producers were to be encouraged to specialize in
their production. Before DDAIP expired, no assembly plant could be
approved. In order to cope with a four-year economic plan, DDAIP was
implemented for three years (1962-1964) and then extended for another
four years (1965-1968).
In 1961, the cabinet also issued the "Industry Assistance Criteria"
(IAC), which stated that the domestic content ratio for any specified
product of the machinery industry should be attained gradually, and
application for a new plant should match the local content ratio achieved
by the existing plants. Based on IAC, the MOEA announced the
"Machinery and Electric Industry Achieving Local Content Program"
(MELCP). According to the MELCP, the MOEA was responsible for issuing
the item and local content ratio every year. The local content ratio was
calculated by the ratio of the difference between price of the final product
and total price of the imported parts to the final product price, where
prices were adopted from the international market.
In 1962, Yue Loong revised the local content agreement with
Nissan to 10% annual growth and up to 60%. Lured by the protective
environment of the auto industry, many applications for setting up new
assembly plants were filed. However, because none of the new plants
could match Yue Loong's 60% local content ratio, all applications were
rejected by the MOEA.
Although Yue Loong worked very hard to guard its monopoly
position, criticism arose because production fell short of increased
demand. In 1966, chassis below 3.5 tons could be imported, and
foreigners were also allowed to import passenger cars with them. The
MOEA, under heavy pressure and constant criticism from the public,
finally lifted the ban on setting up new plants. In 1967, the MOEA
approved technical cooperation programs of Liu Ho with Toyota), San Fu
with Fuji Heavy Industries, and San Yang with Honda. Annual demand
for automobiles at the end of this period exceeded 15,000 units,
compared to only 2,000 units in 1962.
3. Inconsistent Period (1969-1976): In this period, the
government's policy shifted back and forth between considering
consumers' welfare, improving the balance of trade, and promoting the
automobile industry.
In September 1968, the government issued "The Guidelines for
Protecting the Domestic Automobile Industry and Importing Foreign
Automobile" to replace DDAIP. The guidelines stated that the domestic
automobile industry would be "properly protected." The importation of
automobiles would be handled by the Central Trust Bureau and quotas
would be flexibly applied to satisfy the excess demand. In April 1969, the
ban on automobile imports was lifted, and Yue Loong's sales dropped to
2,000 units that year.
In 1969, the government announced that application for new
assembly plants had to satisfy a capital requirement of NT $100 million
(US $2.5 million) in order to improve the stability of operation. In the
same year, Chung Hwa's technical cooperation program with Mitsubishi
to produce trucks was approved by the MOEA.
Toyota ended its cooperative effort with Liu Ho in order to get a
foothold on Mainland China. Ford USA purchased 70% equity in Liu Ho
and renamed the company Ford-Liu Ho in 1972. In 1974, San Yang
accepted 13% equity investment from Honda USA and in 1976, Yeu Tyen
filed for a technical cooperation program with Peugeot France.
4. Strategic Promotion Period (1977-1984): In the automotive
sector the strategic policy shift from import substitution to export
promotion began when the CEPD first announced a new strategy of
export promotion in the Seventh Economic Development Plan, 1976-
1981. The plan called for the upgrading of Taiwan's industrial structure
and a rapid move into the production of high-value-added manufacturers
destined for export.
In January 1978, the MOEA submitted to the Executive Yuan a
general proposal to establish a large-scale automobile plant with an
annual capacity of over 200,000 units of low-priced, fuel-efficient, high-
quality compact cars slated primarily for export. The MOEA chartered a
special Automobile Task force in January 1979 with preparing a
comprehensive report on the state of affairs in the auto sector and
proposing a plan to remedy the prevailing problems afflicting the
industry. This report was submitted to MOEA by mid-summer 1979 and
after revisions and amendments was forwarded to the Executive Yuan,
which approved it on August 30, 1979, as the "Guidelines for
Accelerating the Development of the Automobile Industry." At the same
meeting the Executive Yuan approved the "Big Auto Plant" project as a
part of the new auto industrial policy.
Taiwan's state authorities immediately began the process of
searching for a suitable joint partner for the Big Auto Plant project and
let their intentions be known at the international level. Taiwan
emphasized its stable sociopolitical environment, its comparative
advantage in labor, and the ample supply of highly qualified engineers
and technicians. From seven candidates, Toyota was selected as the joint
venture partner for the Big Auto Plant project. However, this plan finally
collapsed in 1984 after a long negotiation.
5. Institutionalized Promotion Period (1985-1990): The Executive
Yuan issued "liberalization, internationalization, and institutionalization"
guidelines for economic development in 1984. Based on these guidelines,
the "Automobile Industry Development Act" (AIDA) was passed in 1985.
There are two goals for the AIDA: (1) to enhance the competitiveness of
the parts and the automobile industry, and (2) to respond to consumers'
desire for a quality automobile at a reasonable price. The development
policies for ASDA include: (1) reduce protection and reinforce free
competition; (2) induce foreign capital and technology and encourage
exportation; (3) promote research and development, and enhance
technology level; and (4) establish an inspection system and raise
inspection standards.
Although this policy is a compromise between liberalism and
protectionism, it does generate tremendous pressure on the automobile
and the automobile parts industry. The government might have already
achieved some policy objectives to a certain degree. For quite some time,
local producers have been resisting equity investment proposals from
their technical partners. After AIDA was issued, Yue Loong finally
accepted Nissan's investment up to 25% in 1985. Chung Hwa motor
company followed suit and accepted Mitsubishi's investment in 1986. A
new relationship finally evolved, 30 years after the first technical
cooperation program was approved.
Research and development have been enhanced. Yue Loong, Yue
Tien, and Chung Hwa have been awarded commodity tax reduction from
3% to 6% for their efforts to design or modify their own bodies or
chassis. Some design ability has been attained by these producers. In
terms of export, Ford-Liu Ho has exported 6,000 subcompact cars to
Canada each year from 1986 to 1988.
2.3.3 Current Government Policies
Taiwan applied for GATT membership in 1992 and started to
negotiate with other member countries in 1993.10 In order to be
consistent with the free trade stance, the Ministry of Economics Affairs
announced in 1991 that no official Acts will be applied in automobile
sector because of its protective undertone. Instead, "guidelines" will be
announced and implemented, and the government will still do "whatever
it has to do" to push the automobile industry towards the right direction.
International comparisons of current automobile policies are shown in
Exhibit 8.
Exhibit 8: Tariff Rates of Automotive Imports in 1994
Countries Tariff Rate
Taiwan CBD 30%; CKD 18.8% on Average
Japan 0%
Korea CBU 10%; CKD 8%
Brazil CBU 35%; CKD 30%
Mexico CBU 20%; CKD 0-20%
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
0o Baum, Julian. "Waiting for the Call," in Far Eastern Economic Review. March 23, 2993. p47 .
In Aug. 1992, the government announced "The Development
Strategy for Automobile Industry" and set the goal in year 2000 as shown
in Exhibit 9.
Exhibit 9: Future Goal of Taiwan's Automobile Industry in 2000
Output Value of Automobile N.T.$ 360 Billion (7% of Total
Industry Manufacturing; 1,670,000 Units)
Number of Labor Force 150 Thousands of People
Export Value N.T.$ 160 Billion (200,000 Units of
Assembled Automobiles & Parts Equivalent
to 800,000 Units)
Percentage of R&D to Sales 5%
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
In this strategy, government exercised controlling and promotional
policies to shape the future of automobile industry. However, in order to
join GATT, government will help, but not control or intervene in the
development of automobile industry. Current government's emphasis, as
current Minster in Economic Affairs said, is to encourage consolidation of
the manufacturers, reduction of models, and standardization of parts.11
" Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China. 1994. Research of the Impact
of GA TT to Taiwan's Automobile Industry and Future Strategy. In Chinese.
III. Economic Analysis of Taiwan's Automobile Market
3.1 Economic Characteristics of The Automobile Industry
In the Taiwanese automobile industry, high cost of production is a
major problem. In order to realize how the cost factor affects
manufacturers' competitiveness, we must be clear about some basic, but
very important, economic characteristics and their effects on the
automobile industry. We can then conclude that internal economies of
scale should be considered the most important factor for automobile
industries in developing countries to reduce their costs.
3.1.1 Economies of Scale vs. Economies of Scope
In order to lower unit costs, auto makers have two choices: economies
of scale and economies of scope. The term "economies of scale" decides
the way in which the average unit cost of production can be lowered by
mass production; lower unit costs can be achieved by fully utilizing
facilities along the production line and sharing the huge fixed cost among
an increased number of production units. "Economies of scope," on the
other hand, can be sought when firms produce more than one product
and these products are closely linked to one another, for example, when
an automobile company produces automobiles and trucks. In such a
case, the unit cost of production could be lowered by taking advantage
of economies of scope, which result from the joint use of inputs or
production facilities, joint marketing programs, or possibly of the cost
savings of a common administration.12
In the capital-intensive automobile industry, each of the choices has
some advantages. Economies of scale, however, can result in greater
reduction of costs for developing automobile industries because their
12Pindyck, S. Robert and Rubinfeld L. Daniel. Microeconomics. 3rd edition. p213-p218. 1995. New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
low utilization ratios of manufacturing facilities have caused severe
problems in higher production and capital costs. Since the production
volume of an automobile plant is fixed, only when firms can maintain
certain amount of production will they start to expect the extra reduction
of costs that accompany economies of scope. The basic characteristics of
economic scale in the automobile manufacturing process are estimated
as shown in Exhibit 10.
Exhibit 10: Major Economic
Industry
Characteristics of the Automobile
Stage Investment Scale Labor Logistics/Tra
Level Content nsport Costs
Assembly $400-500 100,000 to > 50 percent 10 percent
million 200,000
Major $400-500 500,000 10-20 5-15 percent
Components million percent
Moderate $50-200 500,000 to 10-20 5-15 percent
Processed million 1,000,000 percent
Parts/
Systems
Rough $20-100 200,000 to 10-20 5-15 percent
Process million 1,000,000 percent Higher for
Parts/Syste Except some plastic.
m wiring Lower for
harness, electronics
trim. Radio
assembly 30
percent or
more
Source: IFC (International Finance Cooperation) Data.
3.1.2 Internal and External Economies of Scale
It is obvious that economies of scale can bring cost advantages for
automobile manufacturers. To analyze the effects of economies of scale
on market structure, however, one must be clear about what kind of
production increases are necessary to reduce the average cost.
Economies of scale have two different categories. 13 Internal
economies of scale occur when the cost per unit depends on the size of
an individual firm but not necessarily on that of the industry as a whole.
On the other hand, external economies of scale occur at the level of the
industry instead of the firm. External economies of scale are found in the
case where there are a large number of firms producing similar goods
and volume reduces costs. This gives rise to an obvious circularity, since
a country that can manufacture a product cheaply will also therefore
tend to produce more of it. External and internal economies of scale have
different implications for the structure of industries. An industry where
economies of scale are purely external (that is, where there is no
advantage in having a large firm) will typically consist of many small
firms and be perfectly competitive. The success of the computer industry
in Taiwan provides a good illustration of these economies of scale.
Internal economies of scale, by contrast, give large firms a cost advantage
over smaller ones and lead to an imperfectly competitive market
structure. The failure of the Taiwanese automobile industry discussed
here is a typical case to show problems resulting from a lack of internal
economies of scale. Because internal economies of scale are easier to
identify in practice and of immediate value to the automobile assembly
industry, the author will focus on these internal issues.
13 Krugman, R. Paul and Obstfeld, Maurice. 1994. International Economics: Theory and Policy 3rd
edition. New York: HarperCollins College Published. p1 15-116.
3.2 The Supply Side
3.2.1 Current Manufacturers
In 1992, ten assemblers in Taiwan built about 300,000 vehicles
under contract for American, Japanese, and European nameplates; and
another 130,000 units entered its market in under a recently liberalized
import policy. Almost every foreign producer had exported cars to
Taiwan. In 1994, one new company, Ching Chun, was permitted to
produce commercial vehicles only for exports and its entry had added the
number of total manufacturers to eleven.
"Taiwan is the only market that has virtually every big player," said
Lawrence Wong, Vice President of Ford Lio Ho Motor Co. Ltd.. "You don't
see this anywhere else in the world. It's very unique. Very crazy." U.S.
automakers' ambitions of becoming major players in the Far East are
being tested in Taiwan, a small but free-for-all market where virtually all
the world's makers jostle for space on the country's crowded roads and
streets. 14 This is why Saturn, a secret weapon aimed ultimately at
Japanese compact cars by one of GM's divisions, began its overseas sale
first in Taiwan; in June, 1992, this model was introduced there to test its
competitiveness prior to its sale in the rest of the world.15
Indeed, international auto makers have been investing in assembly
plants throughout Asia, one of the world's fastest growing consumer
markets, after virtually ignoring the region. Among these Asian countries,
Taiwan, with only 20 million residents, is the largest single export market
for US cars, with 39,000 units shipped through first half-year of 1992, as
compared to 43,000 units in all of 1991. In 1989-1990, Taiwan was the
biggest export market in the world for each of the Big Three; all have
sizable operations on the island.
14 Johnson, Richard. "Peddler Paradise," in Automotive News. December 7, 1992. p3.
" Frame, Phil. "Saturns on sale in Taiwan," in Automotive News. June 15, 1992. p2 .
Exhibit 11: Car Sales by Taiwanese Companies
1992 Total:415,458
Kuozoi:8.4%
Yue Loong:1
FordLioHo:2
ts:30.3%
4.3%
San Yang:11.4%
Source: National Statistics
One might ask, since the portion of market shared by each firm is
limited, why so many firms still insist to stay in the Taiwanese
automobile market? Are their revenues from small number of sales large
enough to cover their costs? In fact, we might also see this phenomenon
existing in many other developing countries such as Indonesia and
Thailand.
A general solution to the questions is provided here. Economic
inefficiency occurring in these developing countries, however, does not
necessarily imply lack of profitability for individual firms. Companies
have been able to stay in business, or even prosper, for a variety of
reasons external to the economies of the automobile industry in the
country where they operate. Those reasons include the high prices which
the markets have borne; transfer pricing operations available to firms
where multinational corporations have a significant stake and the
volume of intra-trade is large; in some cases, the availability of credit at
low or negative real rates of interest; and dealing by the firms in activities
bearing little or no relation to the automotive industry.
3.2.2 The Market Structure of Suppliers
In the late 1980s, The level of market concentration was very low
among these automobile manufacturers and this resulted in mushroom-
growing market structure. From Exhibit 12, we can see that in the early
1990s, the output share of top 3 firms in Taiwan was 48%, compared to
95% in Korea, 66% in Mexico, 95% in Brazil, 88% in India. The
Taiwanese market is shared evenly by the domestic producers and at the
Exhibit 12: Structure of Assembly
Countries
Industries in Developing
Source: Peter O'Brien
Automotive Industry.
and Yannis Karmokolias. Radical Reform in the
Region/Country Mid 1980s Early 1990s
No. of Firms Output No. of Firms Output
Share of Share of
Top 3 Top 3
(percent) (percent)
Mexico 5 68 5 66
Brazil 7 82 5 95
Republic of 3 100 6 95
Korea
Taiwan 10 40 10 48
Indonesia 12 64 12 54
Malaysia 7 75 7 62
China 13 46 18 48
Thailand 8 70 8 66
same time the scale of each firm is still small. Therefore, this market
structure cannot be a threat to new market entrants and, on the
contrary, attracts more to join the market. The trend of concentration
from mid 1980s to 1990s is very low, only 8 percent of increase.
During the 1980s, firms in the market still enjoyed some profits
because of government protection. However, in the early 1990s, since
the government has announced its policy to eliminate trade barriers,
these manufacturers had lower earnings. Simultaneously worsened off
by the appreciation of the Yen, only three manufacturers retained
earnings in 1993.
Exhibit 13: Financial Status of Taiwan's Automobile Manufacturers
Year 1991 1992 1993
Firms with 10 8 3
earnings
Firms with loss 0 2 7
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
After 1991, the market shares of the Taiwan domestic
manufacturers began to concentrate faster. The concentration of
automobile market shares has become more obvious, and this causes the
weak companies to get weaker. The ratio of the market share for the first
five largest firms was rising. The sales for smaller firms are declining and
these firms began to lose money. In 1993, there were four firms whose
production was less than 10,000 units. However, this consolidation
occurred too late and should have taken place ten years ago. Since the
Taiwanese market is increasingly threatened by imports, whose price is
significantly lowered because of the reduced tariffs, the speed of
concentration is comparatively too slow for these firms to be well
prepared for future challenges.
Exhibit 14: Concentration of Market Share in Taiwan's Automobile
Industry
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total Market Shares 80.0% 79.9% 84.1% 86.2%
By 5 Biggest
Manufacturers
Source: Industrial Bureau of the
of China
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
3.3 The Demand Side
In the 1980s, due to the rapid economic growth, the demand in
Asian countries including Korea, China, Taiwan had changed
dramatically. The number of automobiles on the road in these countries
had been at least doubled from 1981 to 1988. These emerging markets
nourished the growth of automobile industries in these countries.
Exhibit 15: Automobile Registration by Countries
Country 1981 1988 Percentage
(thousands) (thousands) Change
United States 155,890 179,045 14.9
Japan 37,856 49,902 31.8
Mexico 5,655 7,886 37.7
Brazil 10,291 11,937 16.0
China 930 4,123 343.3
Korea 519 1,611 210.8
Taiwan 482 1,728 204.6
Thailand 881 1,326 50.5
World Total 416,817 518,964 24.5
Source: Automobile International. World Automotive Market. 1983,1989.
From mid 1980s to early 1990s, the growth of new registrations in
developing countries often accomplished by a growth of domestic
production as shown in Exhibit 16. However, although the new
registrations in Taiwan increased tremendously at a ratio of 3.2, the
production grew up at a much lower speed, only at a ratio of 1.5. Partial
(around 20 to 30 percent) of the new car demand was supplied by
imported automobiles.
Exhibit 16: Comparisons of Vehicle Production and New
Registrations
Country Production (MN. units) New Registrations (MN
units)
1991 1991/1985 1991 1991/1985
ratio ratio
Mexico 0.99 2.5 0.64 2.0
Brazil 0.96 1.0 0.77 1.0
Korea 1.50 3.9 1.05 4.3
Taiwan 0.21 1.5 0.55 3.2
China 0.51 1.2 0.62 1.4
Thailand 0.21 2.6 0.30 3.5
Indonesia 0.25 1.8 0.24 1.7
Source: Excerpt From Automotive News,
York.
1992 Market Data Book. New
3.3.31 Demand of the Domestic Market
The annual demand for new car has increased from less than one
thousand to 557,000 units. The annual exceeded 10,000 in 1969,
exceeded 50,000 in 1974, exceeded 100,000 in 1979, exceeded 200,000
in 1986, and exceeded 500,000 in 1992. The growth rate of annual
demand for new car is 21% and the rate for the domestic products is
14% in the 1980s.
However, in this rapidly growing period, imports, especially for
passenger cars from the U.S. and Europe with engine capacity of more
than 2,000 c.c., enjoyed even faster expansion. The market share for
imports increased form 7.5% in 1980 to 9.4% in 1984, 36.3% in 1988. It
reduced to 27% in 1993.
Automobile ownership per thousand people had increased from 1
in 1953, 88 in 1987, to 99 in 1992. Although the cars owned by each
residence is higher in Taiwan than those in the other countries listed in
Exhibit 17, the small population limits the market size. If we take the
area of a country's size into account, the density of automobiles on the
Taiwan road is even higher and this has constrained its growth.
Exhibit 17: World Motor Vehicle Census 1992
Country Car Population Persons Per Car
(million)
Taiwan 2,077,000 20.9 10.1
Brazil 12,128,000 158.2 13.0
Mexico 6,819,000 92.4 13.5
Korea 2,727,862 44.1 16.2
Hong Kong 242,000 5.9 24.3
Thailand 825,072 57.6 69.8
Indonesia 1,294,000 195.7 151.2
China 1,764,871 1,169.6 662.7
Source: 1993-1994 World Automotive Market Report
During the early 1990s, the automobile market in Taiwan has
gradually saturated as shown in Exhibit 18. Lower economic growth,
limitations of road construction, and more difficult parking are slowing
down the expansion of the car market.
-1990 1991 1992
m Imports
- Domestic Cars
m Total Sales
1993
Year
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
Exhibit 18: Taiwan's Automobile Sales
600,000
500,000
400,000
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3.3.2 Demand from Exports
The high cost of production of Taiwanese manufactures limits their
exports. From Exhibit 19, we can see that the export ratio of total output
in Taiwan was less than 1%, compared to the much larger number in
Korea, Brazil, Mexico. We can also see from Exhibit 20 that besides an
sudden increase of exports in the late 1980s, when Ford Lio Ho exported
about 40,000 cars to Canada (Ford Lio Ho sold the cars there as Mercury
Tracers), the export volume has remained very minimal.
Exhibit 19: Export And Import Ratios in Developing Countries, 1987
Country Exports as percentage Imports as percentage
of total production of total sales
Brazil 30 1
Korea 53 1
Mexico 41 1
Taiwan 1 16
Thailand 1 1
Malaysia 1 11
Source: O'Brien, Peter, The Automotive Industry in the Developing
Countries: Risks and Opportunities in the 1990s. The Economist
Intelligence Unit, London, 1989.
3.4 Analysis of The Market
3.4.1 Lack of Economies of Scale
To be competitive in the auto industry, it is essential to cut costs
by increasing production volume and achieving economies of scale.
Exhibit 21, which lists the estimates given by a number of researchers of
the minimum efficiency scale, shows that individual models should be
produced at a minimum level of 200,000 units according to the
traditional mass production principles. This is why in France and
Germany, in the post-World War Two period, Citroen and Volkswagen
mass-produced small cars with no model changes in order to take
advantage of economies of scale.16 However, in 1993, the ten Taiwan
Exhibit 20: Exports of Taiwan-assembled Automobiles
00rU2Cu,..
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Year
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
automobile manufacturers produced a combined total of only about
408,000 vehicles and over 50 models. That is an average of only 40,800
vehicles per manufacturer per year and less than 8,000 units per model
per year. If we look at the production scale of one single model, those
ones produced below 10,000 units stood for two-thirds of the total
production and there was no model with a production over 50,000 units.
16 Baranson, Jack. 1969. Automotive Industries in Developing Countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press. p71.
In 1988, the largest production volume for a single model car was the
San Yang (Honda) Civic with 36,632 units, which is still quite far from
achieving economics of scale. As for the parts suppliers, each
manufacturer has a business relationship with 105 part suppliers, on
average. The size of these suppliers was much smaller. Under these
circumstances, none of these producers can achieve economics of scale
with the limited segmented market.
Exhibit 21: Estimates of Minimum Efficiency Scale
Casting Machining Stamping Assembly
Pratten(1) 1000 250 500 300
Rhys(2) 200 1000 2000 400
White(3) Small 260 400 200
University 1000-2000 400-1000 500+ 200-400
Group(4)
Units: Thousand Units Per Year
(1) Pratten, C.F.(1971) Economics of Scale in Manufacturing Industries
(2) Rhys, D.G.(1971) The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey
(3) White, L.J.(1971) The Automobile Industry Since 1945
(4) University of Bristol Research Group
Source: Krish Bhaskar. The Future of the World Motor Industry. 1980.
NY, NY: Nicholas Publishing Co.
Many people argue today that economies of scale in a modern
assembly line cannot be measured at the individual model level, but,
rather, have to be Japanese-style techniques, and using well-trained
workers and flexible equipment, a modern assembly line can
manufacture many model variations without sacrificing productivity.
However, annual volume per assembly line still needs to be between
100,000 to 200,000 units.17 Even with this argument, the Taiwan
automobile industry is still far away from achieving economies of scale.
In 1991, these were 10 firms in Taiwan and the total production
including commercial cars is 381,890 units. Three among the firms have
production ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 units. The production of
another 5 firms fall in the range of 10,000 to 50,000 units and the
production of rest firms is below 10,000 units.
As one can see, even with modern manufacturing techniques, the
majority of Taiwanese assembly plants are just not big enough to achieve
economies of scale, which makes its costs uncompetitive in the world
marketplace. Therefore, with no exports and with the small demand, the
Taiwan automobile industry is only big enough for at most three large
auto manufacturers, not eleven (one firm joined the market in 1994) we
see today.
3.4.2 International Comparisons
The inefficient structure in Taiwan can be also verified by
international comparisons.
First, we can compare the Taiwanese market structure to other
developing countries. In Korea, the total production was more than two
million units in 1993 because of larger demand from exports. However,
there were only five major auto makers and three of them had production
far over 100,000 units. The Hyundai Motor Co. even had a production
volume of 767,090 units, which was far over the total production of
Taiwanese automobile industry. In Mexico, the total production was
around one million units. Almost half of its production was going to
export. The market shares were concentrated on five firms which had
almost equal production volume of 200,000 units. This market situation
17 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p48.
was beneficial to both the economics of scale and market competition. In
Brazil, its annual production was 960,115 units which was almost three
times that of Taiwan. There were ten firms in the markets, which is
almost the same as Taiwan. However, the production was highly
concentrated among four of them and their scales were above 100,000
units. The rest of the firms had very small amount of production for
commercial purposes.
Exhibit 22: Comparisons of International Automobile Industries,
1993
Country Taiwan USA Japan Korea Mexico
Date Est. 1953 1908 1933 1962 1925
Manufactur 11 Domestic: 11 6 5
ers 3
Foreign: 7
1993 404,524 10,853,72 11,227,54 2,050,058 1,080,144
Production 1 6
1993 649 5,017,761 638,554 493,612
Exports
Export 0.2% 44.7% 31.1% 45.7%
Ratio
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
Next, let's compare automobile industries between developing and
developed countries. The competitive advantage of an industry depends
on two factors: relative wage rate and productivity in home country.
Generally speaking, lower labor costs in developing countries gain more
comparative advantages over the higher production volume and
productivity in developed countries. As we can see in Exhibit 23, total
assembly costs in developed countries are higher than that of developing
with a ratio of 1.4 to 2. However, with the loss of wage advantage,
Taiwan's auto makers have higher costs in their products which are 1.3
to 1.4 times that of developed countries. Consequently, the only way for
them to reduce costs is to raise production volume and productivity.
Exhibit 23: Car Assembly Economics: Developing Versus Developed
Countries
Developing (e.g. Brazil) Developed
Volume per year 100,000 200,000
Total labor hours per 48 22-30
units
Wage rate with fringe 3-5 20-30
Labor cost per unit 144-240 440-900
Other costs per units 450 500-600
(depreciation, taxes,
utilities, overhead)
Total Assembly Cost 594-690 940-1500
Source: IFC (International Finance Corporation) Data.
IV. Factors Leading to The Inefficient Market Structure
4.1 Historical Factors
4.1.1 The Failure of The "Big Auto Plant" in The Early 1980s
Recognizing the inefficient structure existing in its automobile
industry, the Taiwanese government had tried hard to negotiate with
Toyota about the establishment of a large-scale automobile plant with an
annual capacity of over 200,000 units for export in the early 1980s.
Cancellation of the plan for the joint-venture plant, announced on 6
September, 1984, after almost two years of talks, was particularly
embarrassing for the government as it was the centerpiece of efforts to
upgrade local car makers and parts suppliers.
The main sticking points in Toyota deal were export levels and local
content. Taiwan had demanded half of the plant's eventual output of
300,000 cars a year should be exported and 90% of the parts be made
locally. Toyota feared the target would be impossible to attain at
competitive precise, as parts from Taiwan's small scale and relatively
inefficient manufacturers cost 20-60% more than those from Japan or
the United States.
If this project should succeed, the existence of the big auto plant
would have threatened other small firms and new entrants, and,
therefore, accelerated the consolidation process among these firms.
Taiwan would have a strong automobile industry as Korea right now.
4.1.2 The Sudden Rise in Demand in The Late 1980s
After the failure of "Big Auto Plant", the Taiwanese government
tried to promote its automobile industry by the consolidation of existing
small auto makers. Therefore, the "Automobile Industry Development
Act" was carried out in 1984 and ended in 1991. The original goal of this
Act was to use free trade and increasing competition to eliminate the
small and non-competitive auto makers while nurturing two or three
large scale auto makers to dominate the industry and to lead in
exportation. However, due to the sudden rise in auto demand in Taiwan
during the latter part of the 1980's, the government's goal was not
achieved at all.
In 1984, the market demand for autos in Taiwan was only 130,000
units; however, in 1990, the demand has risen to about 500,000 units,
and is expected to rise to 700,000 units by the year of 2000. Between
1985-1990, some research estimated that the consolidation would be
soon happened. However, the increase in market demand coming along
with high economic growth and excess demand stimulated by lowered
tariff gave these manufactures the chances to survive and made money.
This induced two more firms to enter this market during this period and
another one in 1994.
4.1.3 Future Hope in Chinese Market in The 1990s
Because of the pressure from rising labor cost and limited
domestic market in the early 1990s, the Taiwanese manufacturers faced
a dilemma whether to get out of the business or to merge with other
firms. As the consolidation process progressing, the opening of the large
Chinese market gave them another opportunity to stay in the market. In
fact, Taiwan has improved its economy through investment in China and
was the second highest foreign capital investor in China today.18
Two possible forms of manufacturing cooperation which the
Taiwanese firms pursue are illustrated in Exhibit 25. Horizontal
cooperation indicates that firms produce their own final goods and
cooperation through international trade; while vertical cooperation
8 Baltierra, Miguel. '"Looking to the Mainland For Future Growth," in Architectural Record. July 1994.
means that firms are responsible for their own products during the
manufacturing process.
Exhibit 24: Growth of Demand in Taiwan's Automobile Market
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Exhibit 25: Types of Manufacturing Cooperation
Horizontal Cooperation
Vertical Cooperation
Cooperation Forms
Cooperation in Same
Products (F,I)
Cooperation in Similar
Products (F,I)
Cooperation in
Different Products (I)
Cooperation in
Manufacturing Process
(F,I)
Cooperation in
Management (F)
Cooperation Activities
Cooperation in
Quality, Product,
Brand
Manufacture
Cooperation in
Different Products
Within Same
Manufacture
Produce Different
Products Individually
Manufacture
Cooperation in
Upstream,
Downstream Activities
Functional
Cooperation of
Manufactures,
Marketing, Finance,
R&D
F represents cooperation between firm level;
I represents cooperation between industry level.
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
Considering the relative advantages possessed by these two
regions, we can categorize their cooperation in capital and technology
intensive manufactures into four types. Type I represents those
Taiwanese manufactures which have advantage in manufacturing, but
their development is limited by the market size such as the automobile
industry discussed here. Type II is the manufactures lack of market and
technology such as aeronautics industry. Type Ill is the manufactures
which have already achieved economies of scale and the technology in
this field is more advanced than Chinese firms such as electronics. Type
IV is the manufactures with enough market scale, but the technology
level of the Taiwanese firms is still lower than Chinese firms such as
some special mechanical equipment.
Exhibit 26: Types of Capital-Intensive Manufactures
Sufficient
Not
Sufficient
Technical Advantage of Taiwan over
China
Yes
I
B'
No
II
IV
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
Market
Scale
Horizontal cooperation has advantages in enlarging the market,
reducing transportation cost, and specializing products. However, it also
has several disadvantages. First, the outflow of capital will decrease the
investment in Taiwan and reduce work opportunities. Second,
diseconomies of scale will decrease economic inefficiency leading to
higher production cost. Third, for Taiwan, the biggest problem is the
technology transfer. If Chinese firms have learned the technology,
Taiwanese firms will face their competition in the future market. In
automobile industry, we can see the favorable solution for the Taiwanese
automobile industry (Type I in Exhibit 26) is to produce high value-added
products such as engines and transmission systems.
Exhibit 27: Horizontal Cooperation Between Taiwan and China
Value Added
High Medium Low
0 T TM M
I T M M
II M T M
III T T M
IV M T M
(1) 0 represents the labor-intensive manufactures and I, II, I, IV
represents four types of capital-intensive manufactures.
(2) T means Taiwanese firms control, M means Chinese firms control,
and T M means those two share control.
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
Compared to horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation during
the manufacturing process can take advantage of relative advantages on
both sides, and therefore is the key to success in the cooperation
between Taiwan and China. For example, Taiwan can concentrate on
capital-intensive products while China can major in labor-intensive
goods. Because of specialization in certain manufactures, economies of
scale can be easily achieved and the manufacturing process can be more
efficient. Furthermore, Taiwanese firms can take this opportunity to
promote their technology level while specializing certain products.
However, under cooperation in manufacturing, the dependence on each
other will increase. From Type I in Exhibit 24, we can also conclude that
the best solution for Taiwanese auto makers is to assemble cars both in
Taiwan and China by using some minor parts and components made in
China such as lighting system, and market products in both markets.
Through vertical cooperation, these Taiwanese firms can be more
competitive in export markets because of the economies of scale achieved
by supplying both the Taiwanese and Chinese markets. 19
Exhibit 28: Vertical Cooperation Between Taiwan and China
Management Procedure 0 I II Ill IV
Information Collecting T T T>M T T>M
Initial Research & M M>T M T>M M
Development
Technology Developing T T M>T T T>M
Producing M T>M M>T T>M M>T
Quality Controlling T T T>M T T>M
Marketing Chinese M M M T M
Market
& Service Export T T T>M M T>M
Market
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
19 Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China. 1994. Research of the Impact
of GA TT to Taiwan's Automobile Industry and Future Strategy. In Chinese.
4.2 Government Policy Failures
The automobile assembly industry has long been regarded as a
strategic industry in developing countries because it has a deep and far-
reaching influence on other manufactures in these countries. However,
this industry is very difficult to develop successfully because of entry
barriers to the acquisition of technology and strong financial support.
Therefore, the government always plays an important role in developing
its own automobile industry either as a source of financing, protection,
or trade information.
As in other developing countries, the Taiwanese government has
used a high tariff and quota system to protect its own automobile
industry and has hoped to develop the industry from a learning-by-doing
process. 20 However, under this protectionism, these manufacturers have
sought short-term profits rather than the long-term advantages to be
gained by developing enough to compete internationally. Thus, the
government protectionism, unaccompanied by other effective government
policies such as restrictions on setting up new plants, has generated an
inefficient market structure. Worst of all, feeling the pressure from other
trade partners, the Taiwanese government has announced its goal to take
a free-trade stance. As a result, these small manufacturers will face a
crisis of surviving in the near future.
4.2.1 Weak Government Intervention
Some Taiwanese government officials, of course, have realized the
economic problems facing in the automobile industry. However,
government just does not have enough power to guide this industry
properly.
In order to maintain political conformity, the Council for Economic
Planning and Development (CEPD) has played a leading role, as has the
20 Head, "Learning by Doing and Infant Industries," p10-14, 16-39, 47-64.
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), in the shaping of Taiwan's
industrial policies since the early 1950s. However, the industrial policy in
Taiwan is far less depoliticized and insulated than it was intended to be.
CEPD is composed of Taiwan's "techno-bureaucrats," a group whose
power is based on broad managerial and technological expertise rather
than on political affiliation. In the mid-1970s they perceived a
comparative advantage for Taiwan's auto industry and targeted that
industry for development. Ostensibly impressed by the Korean example,
the techno-bureaucrats seemed to favor strong state action in the
automobile sector. Insofar as policy was concerned, they wanted Taiwan's
auto producers and assemblers to streamline operations and achieve
economies of scale in production; they were also ardent champions of
liberalization and called for an end to protectionism in the automotive
sector. Because politics determines economies in Taiwan, the endeavors
of the techno-bureaucrats were repeatedly frustrated by the activities of
societal actors, including domestic and foreign economic interests, that
managed to influence auto industrial auto industrial policy through
connections in top political decision-making circles. 21 Consequently, the
weak state action the Taiwanese government adopted limited the effects
of Taiwan's industrial policies on guiding the industry.
This weak relationship between the government and the industry
also stems from the basic philosophy the Taiwanese government
pursues. Putting heavy emphasis on the even distribution of income, the
Taiwanese government has invested its resources in creating a better
manufacturing environment in which firms can compete equally, rather
than in concentrating on those firms which had the best opportunities to
be competitive in the international market, as the Korean government
did. Therefore, without direct participation in the management of the
2 1 Arnold, Walter. 1989. "Bureaucratic Politics, State Capacity, and Taiwan's Automobile Industrial
Policy," in Modern China. Vol. 15 No. 2, April 1989. p1 8 1- 18 2 .
companies, the Taiwanese government has not been able to guide its
automobile manufacturers.
Furthermore, the basic differences between Korean and Taiwanese
government policies has resulted in different organizational. Taiwan has
more medium and small private companies and Korea has more big
companies with government subsidies. It might be beneficial for Taiwan
to build some industries which have more cost advantages in external
economies of scale such as computer industry. However, in the
automobile industry, which is capital-intensive and has more cost
advantages in internal economies of scale, Korea, which has fewer but
larger firms, has the advantage over Taiwan.
4.2.2 Flaws of Taiwan's Licensing Policy
Taiwan's policy in licensing new auto plants is too flexible and
unplanned. An irreversible mistake was made at the beginning by the
Taiwanese government. In 1953, only one auto plant, owned by Yue
Loong, was allowed to operate. For more than ten years, Yue Loong had
no competitors in the market. Its goal was to maximize profits by taking
full advantage of the protection of high tariffs without preparing
efficiently to enter the competitive world market. This was the complete
opposite to what the government had hoped. The Taiwanese government
finally adopted another extreme policy as a result of public pressure.
This new licensing policy of 1969, though, was too permissive. It required
only a minimum amount of capital and put no restrictions on the
number of auto plants. Its purpose was to be fair to all the qualified
applicants. However, within the ten-year period after the licensing policy
was modified in 1969, six more companies joined the market, so that the
total number of auto makers was increased to seven before the 1980s.
Since then, these two inappropriate policies have shaped the inefficient
market structure we have today from which both government and
industry have suffered for decades.
If we look at the Korean automobile industry, the licensing policy
which strictly limits the number of firms has contributed significantly to
its advantageous market structure. One of its government's goals has
been to build up enough volume to achieve economies of scale and take
full advantage of the low labor costs in Korea. In the early stage of the
Korean automobile industry, the number of licenses issued to new
companies was only three; this was large enough for competition and
small enough for their scales of production. In 1990, after decades of
development, Korea had only five big manufacturers, Sangyong Motors,
Asia Motors, Daewoo Group, Kia Motors and Hyundai Motors. In 1992,
the Korean automobile manufacturers were concerned over the license to
manufacture commercial vehicles granted to the Samsung Group
because they felt the entry of another manufacturer into the crowded car
market would undercut the dwindling shares of their five companies. In
1994, therefore, the Korean government denied Samsung entry into the
automobile market, claiming that another manufacturer would hurt its
competitiveness. 22 In contrast, in the same year, the Taiwanese
government permitted yet another new company, Chin Chung, to enter
the car market and the number of domestic producers was increased to
eleven.
4.2.3 Lack of a Consistent Long-term Policy
The Taiwanese government has been criticized as inconsistent. In
compared with the emphasis on producers' interests by the Japanese
and Korean governments, and the emphasis on consumers' interests by
22 Paisley, Ed. "Samsung's Challenge: South Korean Auto Makers Fear New Rival," in Far Eastern
Economic Review. July 23, 1992. p40.
the U.S. government, a trade-off strategy is pursued by the Taiwanese
government.
Exhibit
Taiwan
29: Restrictions on Setting Up Automobile Factories in
Year Restrictions
1961 The Plan for Developing the Local Automobile Industry was
promulgated, prohibiting the establishment of an automobile
assembling factory.
1969 The minimum capital investment for automobile manufacturing
was specified at N.T. $100 billion.
1977 The establishment of automobile factories with exports
representing 5 percent of production was permitted, and all others
were temporarily suspended.
1979 Establishment of plants for manufacturing heavy-duty trucks and
passenger cars was proposed based on the Plan for Promoting the
Development of the Automobile Industry.
1985 The Plan for the Development of the Automobile Industry was
announced, which included three regulations concerning foreigner
setting up an automobile factory in Taiwan: (1)foreigners could
invest in factories manufacturing parts and components that were
not intended for export; (2) foreigners could invest in and even
own a factory entirely, when all of the factory's output would be
exported; (3) automobile manufacturers who intended to sell to
the domestic market could cooperate financially with foreigners to
build up a factory and then export the products according to
regulations.
Lai, Shyh-Bao. 1992. Taiwan's Enterprises in Global Perspective. ed.
NT Wang. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
The Taiwanese government, of course, has hoped to protect and
develop its automobile industry. However, no minister-level official is
willing to stick his neck out and play the part of a strong advocate for the
industry, especially when liberal economic thinking has suddenly come
into vogue.23
Industrial policy making in Taiwan has been susceptible to societal
pressures and mass media. During the slow development of the
automobile industry, domestic public opinion has become increasingly
impatient with the high price of automobiles. As small passenger cars
came increasingly within the reach of more and more of the urban
middle class, the tariff policy on imported cars became more politicized.
Under public pressure, the government reduced the tariffs from 65% to
42.5% between 1985 and 1988, which boosted the sale of imported cars.
This policy of reducing tariffs has continued until today because
the pressure still exists, but its sources has shifted to some trade
partners demanding free trade. The Taiwanese government has not
protected its automobile industry as it promised. This has made the
manufactures lose confidence toward government and become more
short-sighted, pursuing immediate profits rather than looking at long-
run development. In contrast, the Korean government adopted a
consistent long-term policy by first banning imports, second, limiting
foreign ownership of domestic firms, and third helping to obtain the
necessary technology through licensing. Its industry received a lot of
support in the form of easy lines of credit, favorable tax treatments, and
assistance in exporting. Therefore, the Korean firms were more ambitious
about future development because of their confidence in their
government. One evidence of strong protection from the Korean
2 3 Chu, Yun-han. 1994. '"The State and the Development of the Automobile Industry in south Korea and
Taiwan," in The Role of the State in Taiwan 's Development, eds., Joel D. Aberbach, Davis Dollar, and
Kenneth L. Sokoloff. p12 5 -166. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
government is that even facing strong demands from US for lower tariff
rates on foreign car imports, the Korean government still insists on its
position to guard its market for its producers. 24 However, on the other
side, the Taiwanese government has announced to open the domestic
market in the future.25
To develop the automobile industry needs a decade. However,
Taiwan's industrial policies were often complained by auto makers about
its continuity. A different car policy often comes with each new minister.
For example, in mid-1982, General Motors pulled out of a heavy truck
deal after production had already started when the government changed
its previous commitment to long-term protection from Japanese truck
imports to only a one-to-two-year grace period. Toyota's project of setting
up Big Auto Plant in Taiwan collapsed right after the strongest local
supporter, Economics Minister Chao Yao-tung, was replaced by Hsu Li-
teh in June 1984. This is the second time policy zigzags have aborted a
major vehicle manufacturing venture.
4.3 The China Factor
Major car manufacturers in the world are positioning themselves
for a potential boom in China's car market composed of 1.2 billion
people. However, there are still some barriers to foreign firms who wish
to do business directly with the Chinese. With the political tensions and
economic restrictions between China and Taiwan slowly withering away,
foreign auto makers are looking at Taiwan as their springboard into the
potentially huge Chinese market. As a result, the world's major auto
manufacturers are all gathered on the small island of Taiwan, a situation
not seen anywhere else in the world.26
24 
"Korea Rejects U.S. Demands For Lower Tariff Rates," in Automotive News. August 22, 1994. p4 5 .25 Vines, Stephen. 'Taiwan Reduces Import Tariffs," in Automotive News. Jan 13, 1992. p2 2 .26 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth ofthe Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p90.
4.3.1 Obstacles for Foreign Firms
The Chinese government's plan to develop the automobile industry
and the expanding auto-parts market has attracted heavy foreign
investment. 27 However, it will be difficult for foreigners to do business
directly with China because of language and cultural differences, and
above all, China's xenophobic attitudes.28 China's xenophobic attitudes
rose from historical factors and long disputes with foreign governments.
For example, the Big Three automakers were ahead of the competition in
China's potentially lucrative automotive market; however, accusations by
the US complaining of Chinese government's tolerance of intellectual
property theft in January 1995 could have an adverse impact on this
advantage because China claimed to put all negotiations with US firms
on hold in retaliation. This dispute increased the risks of US
manufactures and worsened China's attitudes toward foreign firms.29
It will be even more difficult for the Japanese because of China's
deep hatred of them developed during World War Two. On the other side,
Japan's big car makers remain wary of China. They are less eager than
their international competitors to obtain a share of the potentially huge
Chinese market. Although they are mainland China's largest importers,
Japanese companies remain cautious about the joint ventures and
technology transfers that Beijing is demanding for the future. They also
worry about the likelihood of strikes and official entanglements in local
factories. Barriers from both sides make cooperation unlikely in the near
future.
In addition to these psychological factors against foreign firms,
there are some more practical problems suggested by Lee. First, the
bureaucracy of the Chinese government is huge and complex; it is
27 "Auto Market Crazes Foreign Investors," in Beijing Review. Aug. 22, 1994. p4 .28 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p90.
29 Johnson, Richard. 'Trade Dispute Sours China on U.S. Cars," in Automotive News. Jan 16, 1995. p3 .
difficult for foreigners to find out who has authority to negotiate and who
has authority over final decisions. Second, for firms involved in joint
ventures, they should have at least 25 percent of equity; this is required
by law (as shown in Exhibit 30). However, because of the economic,
social, and political environment in China, foreign firms have problems
in exerting control over projects to ensure their success. Third, all of the
laws pertaining to foreign investment in China are relatively new and
even these regulations are frequently changed. This is an area of concern
to firms because they need a stable legal environment in order to operate
smoothly. Fourth, protection of proprietary information remains suspect
in the Chinese environment. Foreign firms are suspicious that transfer of
technology may also cause it to lose all rights once the information is out
of their hands. Fifth, political instability increases country risks in
China. Because of these problems, once foreign firms are operating in
China, they must be prepared to tolerate the inadequacies of the
infrastructure, the difficulty in obtaining inputs, foreign exchange
regulations, and problems in developing access to local markets. They
should also be wary of patent protection, and constantly do
environmental scanning to assess the political tides and their effect on
the firms' operations. 30
Therefore, for China, the value of a Taiwanese company over a
foreign firm cannot be too strongly stressed. The "Chinese" identity of a
Taiwanese company will be more welcomed by the Chinese government.
30 Lee, David. 1987. The Automobile Industry in China. Master Thesis, Sloan School of Management at
MIT. p136-159.
Exhibit 30: Foreign
Developing Economies
Ownership of Automotive Companies in
Year: 1987 Percentage of Equity Participation
0-25 26-50 51-75 76-100
China - 3
Taiwan 3 1 1
Brazil 2 1 1 5
Thailand 1 1 4
Mexico 1 2 - 5
Units: Number of Companies
Source: O'Brien, Peter, The Automotive Industry in the Developing
Countries: Risk and Opportunities in the 1990s. The Economist
Intelligence Unit, London, 1989.
4.4.2 Advantages of Taiwanese Firms in The Chinese Market
Chinese-speaking technicians and managers from Taiwan will be
great assets for foreign auto makers when they set up operations in
China. Some day, when China's economy develops enough to support an
automobile industry, Taiwan-made cars, which will probably be
recognized as domestic cars, can be exported from Taiwan to China.
Experienced Chinese-speaking managers from Taiwan can also be sent to
China to set up distribution and sales systems, and even manufacturing
facilities.31
We can see the trend happening already. Toyota is a latecomer to
Taiwan, having set up its Corona assembly line there in 1989. The plant's
total capacity is only 40,000 units a year, but other managers count the
affiliate, which is 22 percent owned by Toyota, as a strong competitor in
the future, because of the Japanese parent's formidable strength
3 1 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p91.
worldwide. Toyota invested in Taiwan in 1970, building the factory now
occupied by Ford. Then it pulled out in 1972 apparently under pressure
from China. In 1990, Toyota was hoping to use Taiwan as a base for
exports to the mainland, where it had no plant, but this would have to
wait until direct trade is finally liberalized, which may take place within
the next few years.32
All the foreign car makers in Taiwan hope that having a foothold
there will enable them to export to China eventually. Although labor
costs in Taiwan are more than 10 times those in China, there are still
factors in favor of Taiwan as a destination for investment. These include
higher productivity, sophisticated labor, and low country risk.
4.4 Difficulty to Merge
Since fewer firms are making money, why don't they merge? There
are some difficulties which make merge strategy untenable. First, the
auto makers have foreign partners, so any decision to merge would have
to be approved by them. Second, the auto makers differ in their ways of
making cars. One company's facilities and equipment may not be
suitable for another. Third, the ego of the Taiwanese auto makers' owners
will not allow mergers to come about. One company loses too much face
if forced to merge with another. Fourth, the major auto makers all have
enough plant space to raise production capacity to 200,000 units if
needed, so mergers should not be necessary.33
32 Far Eastern Economic Review. June 21, 1990. p76.
3 3 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p49.
V. Recommendations
5.1 Acceleration of the Consolidation Process
Su has suggested that the best thing the government can do is
nothing. The government should allow "survival of the fittest" and not try
to save all auto makers.34 Under free competition, with so many auto
makers and so many models, many weaker auto makers will naturally be
left behind and eventually be forced to leave the business. As more and
more auto makers drop out, the few auto makers that survive will be able
to gain an increasing share of the market, and, therefore, be capable of
achieving greater economies of scale in their production.
However, this opinion was too optimistic. Although the number of
firms making money is less, the consolidation is unlikely to take place
merely based on free competition. Ever since the late 1980s, the
competition in domestic market was stiff and the new cuts were expected
to hasten the inevitable consolidation within the industry. Based on this
observation, an industry analyst at the Chun Hwa Institute for Economic
Research, a government-funded think tank, predicted in 1988 that only
three or four of Taiwan's seven car makers would survive in the next six
years. 35 However, the number of firms did not reduce as expected, but
on contrast, it increased eleven in 1994.
Recently, each of the manufactures is continuing to invest in
facilities in order to raise its production volume or productivity as shown
in Exhibit 31. The trend to consolidation is not progressing, but moving
backward at full speed. Therefore, instead of doing nothing, the Taiwan
government should provide more incentives for auto makers to speed up
consolidation internally.
34 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p82.
35Moore, Jonathan. "Full Speed Backwards," in Fareastern Economic Review. Mar. 24, 1988.
Exhibit 31: Recent Investments of Major Taiwan Manufacturers
Planned Investment Time to Finish
Annual Value
Production (Billion N.T.)
Kuozoi (Toyota) 125,000 25 1993:
Expanding
Chung-Lih
Plant
1994: Kwa-In
New Plant
Chin Chun (VW) 120,000 15 End of 1997;
Partial
Production Line
Started In
June, 1994
CAC (Opel) 20,000 1 July, 1993
Chung Hwa 120,000 10.3 End of 1997
(Mitsubishi)
Yue Loong (Nissan) 100,000 0.94 Dec., 1993
San Fu (Renault) 80,000 0.29 Dec., 1993
Prince (Suzuki) 48,000 2 Dec., 1993
Total 593,000 54.5
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
However, in order to cope with the free-trade policy, the Taiwanese
government will have difficulty in controlling or driving the market in a
certain desired direction. However, the government can still guide this
process by giving tax incentives for achieving production. For example, if
an auto maker achieves production of 50,000 units for a single model, its
tax rate can be reduced by five percent. If production reaches 100,000
units then the tax rate can be reduced more. Similar to this method, the
government can follow Australia's lead and increase taxes if a certain
production level is not reached.36
Exhibit 32: Sample Solution to Encourage Mass Production
Annual Production of Exemption of Tariff For Exemption of
Single Model Parts (NT/Unit) Commodity Tax
(Percentage)
30,000 - 40,000 6,000 1%
40,000 - 50,000 8,000 2%
50,000 - 60,000 10,000 3%
Above 60,000 12,000 4%
* Assume the tariff for imported parts in each car to be NT$ 20,000.
36 Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China. 1994. Research of the Impact
of GA TT to Taiwan 's Automobile Industry and Future Strategy. In Chinese.
5.2 Reduction in the Level of High-Tariff Protection
According to the infant industry argument, developing countries
have a potential comparative advantage in manufacturing, but new
manufacturing industries in developing countries cannot initially
compete with well-established manufacturing in developed countries. To
allow manufacturing to get a toehold, in many developing countries, their
governments may use tariffs or import quotas as temporary measures for
getting industrialization started. As in other developing countries, the
Taiwanese government is a follower of this theory and has long protected
its automobile industry
However, economists have pointed out many pitfalls in this
argument. If not properly used, protectionism might make the situation
worse-as seen in the Yue Loong example. The disadvantages of
protection are stated in the following section. First, relative costs of
production have been high by international standards. Second, under a
system of protection, in an industry producing at above international
costs, the net gains from an upgrading of industrial skills may be more
than offset by the net losses due to inefficient plant operations. Third,
because of the high cost of tooling up for low-volume production,
developing countries usually end up with vehicle models and production
techniques that lag behind the latest developments. But since the costs
of research and development are high, little or no effort is made to adapt
product design and production techniques to low-volume production.
Fourth, once production is built into a national economy, it is difficult to
remove because of vested interests. The windfall profits possible under
systems of protection and import substitution encourage the mushroom
growth of small-scale, inefficient plants until markets become saturated.
The higher the tariff wall, the more extensive the inefficient growth-as
can be seen in the case of Chile. There were only 7,800 vehicles
manufactured in Chile in 1964 by 22 firms. Tariffs and domestic content
requirements (25-50 percent) were relatively high for this small number
of vehicles. Installed capacity (29,600 units) was estimated at more than
three times the average annual output in 1964. In addition, the new
protectionism stated that protectionism might deteriorate the whole
nation's welfare. It continued arguing that the Japan-bashing syndrome
fails to consider the significant difference between American and
Japanese standards of living. Despite trade imbalances, Americans have
33% more consumer power than the Japanese. Protectionism tends to
stagnate free trades, deter economic benefits, and discourage new jobs. 37
In addition, most economists strongly support free trade because it
encourages countries to specialize in the goods that they make most
efficiently, exporting these goods in exchange for imports of other goods
that are more efficiently made elsewhere. While US automobile
manufacturers went backward and started to request its government to
impose a large tariff on imported vehicles in an effort to spur further
interest in their products38 , the Taiwanese government has already
announced its intention to take a free-trade stance and lower the tariffs
annually until they are ultimately eliminated. Moreover, the government
also consider to lift the import ban for Japanese cars.39 This author
believes that this policy is on the right track and should continue at an
appropriate speed.
5.3 Improvement in Productivity
5.3.1 Lean Production
While the Taiwanese auto makers are trying hard to raise their
production volume in order to lower their costs, it is also necessary for
37 Stelzer, M. Irwin. 'The new protectionism: protectionism doesn't save jobs or raise anyone's living
standard," in National Review. Mar. 16, 1992. p30.
"8 Dalglish, Brenda. 'The Road Back," in Maclean 's. Jan 25, 1993. p2 6 .
39 Vines, Stephen. '"Taiwan woos Japan; import ban may end," in Automotive News. Mar 9, 1992. p3 6 .
them to improve their productivity through lean production which might
result in more savings in costs.
Even if developing countries like Taiwan with cost advantages in
low wages have achieved economies of scale, it is still very difficult for
them to compete with Japanese cars both in price and quality. The
Japanese have pioneered a production system that permits a continuous
process of building motor vehicles from raw materials to the finished
product. This just-in-time system has proved to be extremely efficient
because the need for inventories is reduced by removing bottlenecks in
the manufacturing process. This system provides Japanese firms with
more efficient and productive manufacturing, allowing them to reduce
the time needed for making a car from 250 to 130 hours. This was
achieved in the time period between 1970 and 1981.
Japanese efficiency has offset the low-wage advantage of other
countries. For example, in 1980 the Korean Ministry of Commerce
estimated that the production cost of a Pony built in Korea was $3972
while the estimated cost of a Toyota built in Japan was only $2300. A
cost savings of almost $1700 was achieved despite the vast difference in
wage rates, $1 per hour in Korea versus $7 per hour in Japan. Korea has
a better developed industrial infrastructure than many of the other
developing countries and its productivity is also correspondingly higher.
The cost advantages that the Japanese enjoy imply that either wages in
the developing countries have to go down much further or that
productivity has to go up much higher.40 Since rising labor costs in
Taiwan is a serious problem, the only way to reduce costs is to promote
productivity.
This system is continuously improved by the Japanese and its
effect on production is eye-opening as shown in Exhibit 33 and Exhibit
40 Lee, David. 1987. 'The Automobile Industry in China," Master Thesis, Sloan School of Management at
MIT. pl00.
34. A world assembly survey researched by IMVP showed that Japanese
plants require one-half the effort of the American luxury-car plants, half
the effort of the best European plants, a quarter of the effort of the
average European plants, and one-sixth the effort of the worst European
luxury-car producers. At the same time, Japanese plants greatly exceed
the quality level of all plants except one in Europe-and this European
plant requires four times the effort of Japanese plants in assembling a
comparable product.41
One additional and very important finding of the survey by IMVP is
worth noting. They found that there was almost no relationship between
productivity and quality, contrary to their expectations. What accounts
for the manufacturing advantages for both higher productivity and
quality standards of Japanese firms? The answer is lean production. The
truly lean plant has two key organizational features: It transfers the
maximum number of tasks and responsibilities to those workers actually
adding value to the car on the line, and it has in place a system for
detecting defects that quickly traces every problem, once discovered, to
its ultimate cause. 42 Exhibit 35 also shows that some of the best plants
in developing countries (including Taiwan, Korea, Mexico, and Brazil)
were very productive. This indicates that some opportunities for the
Taiwanese firms to compete in the international market still exist if they
too can get lean.
41 Womack, P. James, Jones, T. Daniel, and Roos, Daniel. 1990. The Machine that Changed the World.
New York: Rawson Associate. p9 2 .
42 Womack, P. James, Jones, T. Daniel, and Roos, Daniel. 1990. The Machine that Changed the World.
New York: Rawson Associate. p9 9 .
Exhibit 33: Luxury Car Assembly Plant Productivity, 1989
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Exhibit 34: Lu•xry Car Assembly Plant Quality, 1989
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Exhibit 35: Assembly Plant Productivity, 1989
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5.3.2 Flexible Manufacturing
Mature markets in North America, Europe, and Japan are rapidly
fragmenting. In the U.S., for example, the number of physically distinct
cars on sale has increased from around 25 in the mid-1950s to more
than 90 in the mid 1980s. The sales volume for these products has fallen
from an average of more than 300,000 units per year to around 100,000.
The fact that the number of products offered is continuing to rise and
the number of sales per product is continuing to fall suggests that
consumers are now more concerned with obtaining a vehicle which
meets their precise needs rather than simply obtaining a vehicle with a
lower cost. This change is beneficial to the Taiwanese automobile
industry because it is exactly the kind of production that it is
accustomed to.
Exhibit 36: Fragmentation of American Vehicle Market, 1955-1989
Number of Products on 1955 1973 1986 1989
Sale
American Products 25 38 47 50
European Products 5 27 27 30
Japanese Products 0 19 41 58
Total 30 84 117 142
Source: Womack, P. James, Jones, T. Daniel, and Roos, Daniel. 1990.
The Machine that Changed the World. New York: Rawson Associate.
Exhibit 37: Annual Production Volume of the Average Model
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However, increasing the models in the production lines requires
that the efficiency brought by mass production must deteriorate
simultaneously because the production volume of each model is reduced.
In order to produce more models while enjoying cost advantages in
economies of scale, it is also essential for the Taiwanese firms to learn
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). Traditionally, costs have been
reduced either through dedicated automation for the production of one
product to achieve scale economies or through low wage rates. However,
the flexible manufacturing system offers a method of achieving
economies of scale over a range of products. Whereas in older assembly
plants, a minimum of 250,000 units of the same model is required to
achieve acceptable scale economies, with a flexible manufacturing
system one can assemble a total of 250,000 units of several different
models.
5.4 Changes in the Market Structure
The fundamental obstacle to production efficiency is the
diseconomies of scale associated with production oriented toward
internal markets of limited size. Adjustment models must seek to
overcome the scale disadvantage either through extending the size of the
market or rationalizing production so as to achieve larger production
runs. The former may be achieved through regionalism or specialized
production for world markets. The latter may be realized by reducing the
number of models and plants serving domestic markets.
5.4.1 Rationalization of Production for The Domestic Market
National programs aimed at the standardization and
interchangeability of components and parts can advance production
efficiency through longer production runs. In some cases, more economic
scales have been achieved through the use of consolidated assembly
facilities for various models and makes or through the joint utilization of
a parts manufacture plant to serve a broader range of equipment
manufacturers. 43 It will be even more helpful if the automakers can
adopt Japan's flexible manufacturing technology.
One possible method for rationalizing production is through the
national car strategy, which was adopted by Volkswagen in its beginning
to lower the cost of its cars. In a national car strategy, only one car model
is offered, and consumers do not have any other choices. Today,
however, consumers are exposed to and demand more and more variety
in products. They are sophisticated and will not let products be forced on
them, as is the case with a national car strategy. Consequently, the
national car strategy is not appropriate today and instead, small scale
production for different models has become inevitable.
Tightening the relationship between suppliers and manufacturers
in Taiwan will provide opportunities for rationalizing production. The
firms involved in the automobile industry will be able to meet together
and negotiate the possible production lines in which each firm can
specialize. Each firm produces only certain parts or models in order to
achieve mass production. This strategy might work because it allows
firms to benefit each other.
However, for some major components such as engines, it is very
difficult for individual firms to develop because of either the capital or the
technology. In addition, firms might worry about the risks of incurring
the huge "start-up" costs of adapting technology to local circumstances
or opening new markets. In this case, governments might play an
important role in helping firms work together to share risks. For
example, in 1990, the Taiwanese government started with a plan for a
common engine and currently is pushing very hard for the development
43 Baranson, Jack. 1969. Automotive Industries in Developing Countries. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press. p74-76.
of this project. The government has asked Taiwanese auto makers for
support. It plans to spend NT $3 billion (about $100 million) to develop
this engine and manufacture about 300,000 units by 1995. The goal is to
promote technology through participation from manufacturers and
reduce costs by mass production. This plan will also help local producers
to get out of the control of foreign partners.
The common engine plan began in 1990 by figuring out the design
concept and doing the feasibility analysis. The firms with direct
participation include Yue Loong, Chung Hwa, and Yeu Tyen and the rest
of the firms were in indirect participation. In 1993, the plan went into the
stage of detailed design and the Lotus Company in England was in
charge of the detailed design of the engine and the development of the
prototype. The objective products are 1.2L engines with 8 and 16 valves.
The development of a prototype was estimated to be finished in August,
1994 and would be pushed to the stage of investment in production.
MOEA hoped to build a new company which would do the production
and the development of the common engine. The main financial
resources were from private investments. The investment of a new
company was estimated to be NT $ 2.4 billion and the annual production
was 95,000 units.
Many auto makers feel very skeptical about this proposal.44 The
biggest difference among cars is the engine, and each auto maker takes
pride at the engine they produce. To use a common engine will be
difficult for them to accept, and even if they do decide to accept a
common engine, the engine may not necessarily fit the cars they put in.
Today, the trend is towards specialization in manufacturing in different
countries. Taiwan, compared to Japan, just does not have the industrial
base, technologies, and other advantages needed to manufacture engines
44 Kuozui Motor Co. Ltd. 1989. Suggestions for the Development of the Taiwanese Automobile Industry.
In Chinese. p48.
well. Furthermore, this strategy would not be acceptable to consumers.
Consumers today demand a wide range of choices when buying cars, and
a common engine would decrease the number of models offered. The
failure example was given by Australian experience. In 1977, the
Australian government expressed its desire for a common engine. As a
result, Toyota began using the GM-Holden engine in its Corona model.
However, the engine just did not fit well with the car, resulting in many
quirks and severely damaged Toyota's quality image in Australia.45
However, the situation in Taiwan is very different from Australia.
This small 1.2L engine is aimed at low-end customers who are more price
sensitive rather than performance oriented. As long as the engines can
possess good quality and fit into cars well, the cost lowered by
localization might stimulate excess demand from the large population of
motorcycle riders in Taiwan. On the other side, since the engines are the
same for auto makers in this market level, manufacturers have to make
their products more attractive by offering better price, quality, design,
and service, which will provide incentives for these firms to progress or
consolidate. In the international automobile market, we can find many
similar examples. Strategic alliances between Ford and Mazda, Honda
and Austin Rover, allowed them to lower developing cost by using some
basic designs such as chassis and engines in some models. These cars
they produced distinguished each other from properties brought by
different brand names and competed in the same market.
Moreover, with the reduction of production costs, the probability to
export either parts or the whole automobiles would increase. If we aimed
at the motivation for exports, even if fewer models reduced the sales in
domestic market, the larger exporting market might compensate for this
4 5 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p89.
and give rise of more opportunities for mass production. At that time, the
small domestic market is no longer crucial for manufacturers.
In fact, the main point of this project is the promotion of
technology, which gives future advantage. The success of this project
can, in addition to producing physical output, create intangible benefits
such as knowledge or new markets. Facing competition from other
developing countries with lower cost, Taiwan has to upgrade its industry
level from labor intensive to technology or capital intensive and its
human resources and industry bases are ready for this change. From
this point of view, no matter how worse the evaluation of future markets
for this engine shows, this common engine project is worth developing in
the long run.
5.4.2 Regionalism and Barter Trade
A very different path to the future involves "regionalization", which
is to say development focused within regions, such as East Asia, rather
than on product flows from less to more developed countries. This
possibility is based on the following factors and trends.
The Asian rim, including Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and
China, is likely to be the area of greasiest demand growth for motor
vehicles during the remainder of this century and well into the 21st
century. By contrast the mature motor vehicle markets -- the U.S.,
Western Europe, and Japan -- are likely to be totally stagnant in annual
demand for units. Penetration of these mature markets by new entrants
from low-wage areas will become progressively more difficult because of
the competence of large firms in Japan, the U.S., and Europe. Therefore,
manufacturers within these developing countries tend to focus growth
plans on this region rather than on external markets. This makes
regionalism more possible. In fact, the Asian & Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), a meeting participated by those countries within
the area, has allowed some degrees of regionalism to happen. Taiwan is
currently planning the Asian & Pacific Transportation and Manufacturing
Center in order to take advantage of this potential market.
We can see that the trend of regionalism in the Asian region is also
consistent with trends in the rest of the world. The most ambitious of
these moves was the attempt to create a unified market in Europe,
generally referred to as "1992." It is unusual in that the countries
involved already constituted a customs union, with no tariffs or quotas
on internal trade. What Europe was aiming for was something deeper-in
effect, to eliminate completely the distinction among its different national
economics.
In North America, attentions now are focusing on the creation of a
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the governments of
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In November 1993, after one of
the most fiercely contested battles in the history of U.S. trade politics,
NAFTA was finally ratified by the U.S. Congress. From Tuktoyaktuk to
Tapachula, over three-hundred and sixty million people would be linked
together in the world's largest free trade market. According to the NAFTA
provisions, the tariff for automobiles and parts will be gradually
eliminated by the year 2004. The implementation of the NAFTA has led to
the proliferation of US-made automobiles in Mexican markets. At the
same time, the NAFTA allows Mexico to increase its exports to the US
and Canada and enables US automobile manufacturers to integrate their
Mexican operations more closely to their North American plants. The law
also generated plenty of foreign investments for Mexico despite the
country's turbulent political climate.46
Finally, in 1991 the South American nations of Brazil, Uruguay,
and Argentina formed a customs union, generally known as Mercosur.
46 Versical, David. "Small Cars Are Mexico's Future; NAFTA Could Fuel Growing Demand," in
Automotive News. Nov. 15, 1993. p4.
Few observers gave the union much chance of success given past failures
in the region and the political and economic turmoil in Brazil. In its first
year of operation, however, Mercosur astonished the skeptics as trade
among its members surged by 50 percent.
Are the agreements a good thing? Most analysts believe the direct
effects of NAFTA and "1992" will be clearly positive (there has been little
careful study of Mercosur). That is, the gains from trade creation will
outweigh any losses from trade diversion. The concern is, instead, that
the large economic blocs being formed may turn protectionism against
the outside world-for example, that 1992 will pave the way for "Fortress
Europe." All of the policymakers involved deny that this will happen; it
remains to be seen if they are right.47
5.4.3 International Specialization, Cooperation and Strategic
Alliances
International specialization has become popular in the automobile
industries. Because of economies of scale, no country is able to produce
a full range of manufactured products. In order to reduce their cost of
production, manufacturers in the world market purchase parts and
components from other countries with relatively low costs. A reduction in
the cost of transportation in the future will enlarge this intra-industry
trade, which means the exchange of manufactured goods for
manufactured goods. (Intra-industry trade is distinguished from inter-
industry trade, which means an exchange of manufactured goods for
food).
One possible form of international cooperation is by forming
strategic alliances, which is project-oriented cooperation rather than a
long-term relationship. In Exhibit 38, we can see that the number of
47 Krugman, R. Paul and Obstfeld, Maurice. 1994. International Economics: Theory and Policy 3rd
edition. New York: HarperCollins College Published. pl78-179 .
strategic alliances in the automobile industry has increased
tremendously, because such alliances have advantages in technology
complementarity, reduction of innovation time span, and new market
access as seen in Exhibit 39. There are three types of alliances: joint
ventures, nonequity alliances, and minority equity alliances. Traditional
joint ventures are formed when two or more partners create a newly
incorporated company in which each has an equity position. The Austin
Rover-Honda alliance, for example, is a nonequity alliance in which the
two firms work together to develop and produce, but not market, a
number of different automobiles. The activities undertaken by the Ford-
Mazda alliance are similar, but because Ford owns 25 percent of Mazda,
this is categorized as a minority equity alliance. 48
Korea, because of its similarity to Taiwanese economic
development, and China, because of its complementarity in technology
and labor resources, are both especially important partners of the
Taiwanese automobile industry. Although Korean manufacturers enjoy a
large export market, its rising labor costs have increased their costs.
Without a price advantage, Korean automobile industries find it very
difficult to compete with Japanese firms, which achieve high quality with
lower cost through mass production and efficiencies. A study by Suh
suggested that the Korean government should consider a regional
development plan between itself and Taiwan, whereby each country
would produce 50% of the necessary components for a passenger car
and barter the products for assembly in each country.49 Marketing and
service would be the responsibility of each country. The existing vendors
producing the items to be mass-produced by the other country should be
encouraged to maintain and update their facilities so as to be
48 Killing, J. Peter. "Understanding Alliances," in Contractor, J. Farok and Lorange, Peter, eds.,
Cooperative Strategies in International Business. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988. p5 6 .49 Nam Pyo Suh. An Assessment of Critical Issues Confronting the Korean Machinery Industries. July
1980. p13.
competitive. In some cases, government subsidies for these vendors may
be necessary.
China is building its own automobile industry. Although it has the
advantage of low labor costs, China needs more experience and
technology in order to develop its industry. There is a delicate
relationship between Taiwan and China: these two entities used to be
enemies in politics, however, they are close together in economic
development today. Taiwan needs advantages in low labor cost and large
market, on the other side, China is eager to acquire technology and
experience. Although Japanese and American firms might be better
partners for China, there are physical reasons why Taiwan is in a better
position to help China develop its automobile industry as stated in China
factor.
Exhibit 38: Growth in Strategic Alliances, Automobile Industry
Region 1980-1984 1985-1989 Percentage
Change
Number Percent Number Percent
United 10 39 24 30 140
States-
Europe
United 10 39 39 49 290
States-
Japan
Europe- 6 23 16 20 167
Japan
Total 26 100 79 100 203
Source: United States Congress, Office
figure 5.3.
of Technology Assessment, 1993,
Exhibit 39: Reasons for Strategic Alliances in Automobile Industry,
1980-89
Automobile Number of Alliance 205
Industry
High Cost Risks 4%
Main Lack of Financial Resources 2%
Reason Technology Complementarity 27%
For Reduction Innovation Time Span 22%
Alliance To Share Basic R&D 2%
Market Access/Structure 52%
Monitoring Technology/Market Entry 4%
Source: Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1990a).
5.5 Promotion of Parts Industry
5.5.1 Characteristics of Taiwan's Automobile Parts Industry
The characteristics of Taiwan's automobile parts industry can be
examined in three groups, namely the OEM supplier for the domestic
market, the suppliers for the international new car market, and suppliers
for international aftermarket. First, the Taiwanese OEM suppliers for the
domestic market are flexible. Because the demand is low, they have to
produce different parts and even supply competing assemblers. The labor
force is relatively well educated, their responses to modifications on
design or manufacturing process is quick, extensive, and friendly. In
recent years, they have been cooperating with assemblers to improve
product manufacturing and management. Although they are good at
modification, they are relatively weak in design and development. Excess
capacity is a problem they should solve in order to meet challenges in the
future. Second, the suppliers for the international new car market are
very internationalized. Some of them, such as wire harness suppliers, are
very competitive in terms of quality, cost, and delivery. Since the
technology requirements for these parts are relatively low, their position
might be replaced by other new entrants. Third, the suppliers for
international aftermarket are flexible and competitive in cost; however,
they have to deal with problems like the appreciation of the NTD (New
Taiwan Dollar), and increasing wages.
5.5.2 Future Opportunities
The Taiwanese government has announced its intentions to follow
the example of Belgium, "Europe's parts center," to nurture Taiwan into
becoming "Asia's parts center." Belgium does not make its own brand of
cars; however, its parts industry is very strong, and many famous
European car makers manufacture components and assemble cars in
Belgium. The Belgian parts industry contributes 15 percent of Belgium's
total GNP. 50
Exhibit 40: Automotive Component Exports from Developing
Economies
Country 1980 1985 1987 Percentage
Change
1980-1987
Taiwan 94.7 345.6 618.3 552.9
Argentina 63.3 62.9 67.2 6.2
Singapore 82.6 78.5 98.4 19.1
Thailand 9.3 11.4 21.3 129.0
Korea 20.5 93.0 181.0 782.9
Malaysia 2.7 3.7 5.7 111.1
Units: Million US Dollars
Source: United Nations Trade Data, 1989.
Taiwan's situation is very similar to that of Belgium. Most of the
major world auto makers already assemble cars in Taiwan; Taiwan just
lacks a strong parts industry. In 1991, there were 2,657 companies
related to automobile manufacturing. Companies with less than 100
workers accounted for 95%. Taiwan can start exchanging parts with
other manufacturing affiliates in order to lower costs for both. Therefore,
current government policy imposes upon firms which import parts and
components from Japanese partners the responsibility to sell back
domestic parts. The minimum ratio of exports for parts and components
to total imports is 2.5% in 1991 and has increased annually to 10% in
1995. Moreover, firms can consider international manufacturing and
interchange systems based upon national specialization in components
50 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p88-89.
or products. The possibilities include the manufacture of specialized
components and parts, responsibility for a particular vehicle line,
specialization in low-volume replacement parts for obsolete models, or
the reconditioning of engines and parts.
Exhibit 41: Exports of Parts From Taiwan to Affiliate OEMs in 1993
System Million N.T. Dollars Percentage of Exports
Yue Loong 1,274 24.75%
Kuozoi 1,040 15.00%
Chung Hwa 1,024 20.71%
San Yang 858 16.72%
Ford Lio Ho 494 9.00%
Yue Tyen 148 9.40%
Da Ching 65 5.48%
Source: Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic
of China
The Taiwan auto and part makers are preparing themselves to
become major parts and components suppliers for the Japanese auto
makers. The Japanese auto makers are setting up a network of
manufacturing facilities throughout Asia in its push towards
specialization in manufacturing. For example, Shoichi Toyoda, President
of Toyota Motors of Japan, said that Toyota's globalization plan is to
"optimize its operations by planning and managing all of them from a
global perspective."5s This means buying parts, building cars, and selling
them around the world regardless of national boundaries. The world
would become a giant Toyota City and Toyota will establish operations
whatever they make economic sense.
Toyoda said that Asia is an example of how Toyota would like to
operate in the future. Toyota has built a network of production facilities
51 Alex Taylor III. 1990. "Why Toyota Keeps Getting Better and Better and Better," Fortune.
in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and Taiwan,
specializing in certain parts and components it has a competitive
advantage in , while still continuing to manufacture complete vehicles in
each nation. It has established a long term and stable part supplying
network, which will help it capture a bigger share of the growing Asia
auto market. By supplying each other with components, Toyota's plants
in these countries can achieve greater economies of scale with each item
than if they try to manufacture everything alone.52
5.6 Development of Export Markets
The ability to export automobiles is crucial for the Taiwanese auto
industry. Because of Taiwan's small and saturated domestic market, the
only viable way for the Taiwanese auto industry to develop and grow is to
export. Exports would solve its upstream and downstream capacity
problems and help it break out of the vicious cycle it is currently
entangled in.
Exhibit 42: Foreign Trade Orientation in Vehicle Sector, Early 1990s
Region/Country Share of Output Going Share of Supply
to Exports (percent) Coming from Imports
(percent)
Mexico 35 5
Brazil 20 negligible
Republic of Korea 25 <1
Taiwan, China <1 30
Indonesia negligible negligible
Malaysia 10 13
Thailand 7 3
52 Toyota Motor Corp. Annual Report. 1990.
Source: United Nations, International Commodity Trade Data Base; and
Automotive Manufacturers' Associations of Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia,
India, Malaysia, Thailand.
5.6.1. Improvement in Quality and Technology
Quality is of the utmost importance before firms start exporting.
Suppliers must strive to apply a "zero defect" philosophy to their
operations as well as to ensure that their product performs harmoniously
with the other parts of the car. At the same time, car manufacturers
should help their suppliers to develop a strong capability in product
design and technological innovation. That means that they must invest a
lot on R&D.
The quality and reputation of a car directly influence its sales. In
the early stage of Hundai's exports to the North American market, the
bad reputation of the Excel it produced had pushed Hundai to spend
more on research to rebuild its image. Feeling 101, the first Chinese-
designed car, was introduced to both domestic and foreign markets by
Yue Loong in 1986. In spite of the high expectations of the Taiwanese
people, this car failed in its sales due to the quality problems. In order to
ensure the project's success, Yue Loong set up an engineering division of
300 technicians and spent more than NT $2 billion on the car's design
and development. After an initially favorable reception, customers began
to complain because the locally produced components broke down. Sales
slumped after a weak promotion campaign. Only 9,450 units were sold in
the first year and 3,846 in the second.
In fact, feeling the pressure of lower labor advantages from other
developing countries such as China, Malaysia, and Thailand, the
Taiwanese government has tried hard to raised its technology level and
product image. MOEA is pressing the country's car makers to triple their
R&D budgets by 2000. Although the quality of Taiwanese cars is
improving, however, Taiwanese car-parts makers have found their
exports hindered by a poor image overseas. Therefore, the Taiwanese
government aims to educate consumers worldwide that Taiwanese
products are equal in quality, design, and price of those made
anywhere.53
Recently, Taiwan automobile firms have succeeded in changing
their position from technology input to technology output. For example,
Chun-Hwa Motor CO and TEMSA group in Turkey signed up a contract
to produce a new model, which is designed by Chun-Hwa Co. This 1.1L
commercial car will be on sale soon in Turkey. The annual production is
3,000 units in the first year and gradually increases to 24,000 units in
the fourth year. Except providing the technology, parts, Chung Hwa
Motor Co. will also help Turkish manufacturers to promote their part
industries and raise their local content ratio. Right after that, Chun-Hwa
got the approval form Mishubishi Co. in Japan to output its technology
and cooperate with Sun-She Motor. Group in China to produce
Mishibishi commercial cars named Delica with a annual production of
7,200 units. This is a good direction for other manufacturers to follow.
In addition, automobile manufacturers should also notice the
worldwide trend toward automobile demand and prepare themselves for
the technology changes. For example, Environmental Priority Strategy
(EPS) has been integrated into the decision-making process together with
the traditional cost analysis. Environmental cars which have less weight,
less emissions, and are more recyclable have become more popular in
Germany and this concept will spread around the world soon. Another
example is the change in materials. The replacement of steel sheet with
plastics or aluminum is gradually increasing because of their light-
weight property, which implies more fuel-economy and better
performance.
53
"It's very well made in Taiwan," in Nation 's Business Jan 1993. p29.
Exhibit 43: Estimated Development of Material Content. 1989-2000
Iron/Steel Aluminum Plastics
Model Year 1989 71 3 7
Model Year 1990 65 5 13
Model Year 2000 60 8 17
Source: Consultants for Trade and Industry. European Industry's
Investment Outlook in LDCs. June 1989.
5.6.2 Expansion of Export Markets
The number of countries for Taiwan to export assembled cars in
the near future is limited. First, firms from similar developing countries
such as South Korea and Mexico have occupied the huge European and
North American markets by their cars they produced with good quality,
reasonable price, and any other advantage Taiwan might have. The
regionalism in these regions makes it more difficult for outside firms to
compete with local advanced ones. Second, selling cars back to Japan is
also very difficult. Japan's strict quality standard, competitive
marketplace, efficient manufacturing process, and its low car prices all
make this option unrealistic for Taiwan auto makers. Finally, markets in
the newly developing countries in East Asia region are even well
protected by their governments and difficult to enter.
Recognizing that the models produced in Taiwan are not
economically efficient and knowing that Taiwan is going to join GATT,
some Taiwanese manufacturers are trying hard to find overseas
production base and through the enlargement of production, they can
lower their costs of production. Among those possible countries, China,
with the same race, language, and culture, is the best choice for Taiwan
to export. However, although Taiwan firms have a special advantage in
economic cooperation with China, they are also taking a decreasing
political risks. Therefore, it is crucial for the producers to diversify their
export market, not only concentrate on one market. Actually, we can see
this strategy already adopted by the Korean firms. They penetrated the
American market first and then followed by relying less on the US market
and increasing exports to Europe.
However, it is impossible for Taiwan to export its own brand of car
in current stage. First, the government is not supportive enough,
especially since it is moving towards a less protective economic policy.
Second, the auto makers have no experience selling abroad. Third, the
cost for advertising and setting up a sales network abroad is too high,
and Taiwan auto makers don't have that kind of financing. And finally
competition abroad from the established foreign brand names is too
tough. Facing the difficult to export its own brand, the best strategy for
the Taiwan auto makers is to export using its foreign partner' brand
name and sell through their export and market channels abroad. This
kind of third country trade has been gaining acceptance by Japanese
auto makers. For example, Toyota has been producing the "Kijiang" (Asia
Car) in Indonesia for export to other Asian countries. 54
54 Su, Justin C. 1992. Factors Impeding the Growth of the Taiwan Automobile Industry. Master Thesis,
Sloan School of Management at MIT. p80-81.
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